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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4a-103(2)(j). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellant must show material findings that are clearly erroneous by 
marshaling all evidence supporting the findings, then showing this evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings. See Gilmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App 2^19, 224 
P.3d 741 (stating clearly erroneous standard of review); Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82, H 19,100 P.3d 1177 (stating marshaling requirement). 
A District Court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, U 10, 94 P.3d 193 
(citation omitted). 
The appellant must show legal error by the trial court in its use of fixed 
principles and rules of law, demonstrating the trial court incorrectly selected, 
interpreted, or applied the law. See State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
A challenge to a grant of summary judgment presents a question of law, 
which appellate courts review for correctness, and in doing so, appellate courts 
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
favorable to the nonmoving party. So/7/77 v. Dixie Eye Center, 166 P.3d 614 (Utah 
App.2007). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Ann. $ 38-1-5. Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the 
building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground. (1953) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order in which the District Court 
determined that the Claimants mechanics' liens had priority superior to the trust 
deeds of Defendant/Appellant (collectively the "Bank") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-5 (1953). The Midtown Village Project is a phased mixed-use development 
providing commercial, retail and residential spaces on State Street in Orem, Utah. 
The Midtown Village Project ("Property" or "Project") was developed by Larry J. 
Myler ("Developer") with the intent to fund the construction of the Property initially 
from (1) his own resources, (2) construction loans from various sources, (3) bond 
funds received from the City of Orem, and (4) other financing. The foregoing 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
financial resources were to be supplemented by cash flow generated from the sale 
of residential condominiums, retail spaces and commercial leases obtained before 
and during construction. 
The Midtown Project was to consist of an Icon office building surrounded by 
a Main Building consisting of three wings or towers collectively served by a central 
utility plant. The towers in the Main Building were to have retail spaces on level 
one, office space on level two and residential condominiums in levels three 
through seven.1 
In the fall of 2004, Marshall Investment Corp. ("Marshall"), after arranging an 
initial unsecured loan of $562,000 to commence construction on the Project, went 
about structuring and securing a syndicate of lenders to fund a loan for the 
construction of the Project. After receiving some but not enough participant 
lenders, Marshall determined that the transaction was not strong enough for 
syndication without additional financial strength on the part of the borrower. 
Marshall asked the Developer to obtain another stronger guarantor. To that end 
Jerry C. Moyes was identified and contacted to support the financing of the Project 
with his personal guaranty. Thereafter, Marshall continued with its marketing the 
Project to potential lenders. On June 16, 2005, Marshall finalized its loan for the 
Project (which it had actively marketed since the fall of 2004) and funded the 
1
 See a copy of the architectural rendering of the Project and a photograph of the 
model created by the Developer of the Project attached hereto as First 
Addendum to Brief, [R. 5337-5507, Exhibit "D"]. 
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construction loan. At the time the loan closed, several contractors who had 
deferred payment or gone unpaid for work or services previously performed on the 
project until financing could be formalized, received payments from the loan. 
The Plaintiff/Appellees mechanics' liens (collectively the "Claimants") are 
architects and contractors who provided materials and construction services in the 
improvement of the Property. The Claimants did not get paid for those 
improvements and as a result, filed and foreclosed their liens now hold against the 
Property. Ellsworth Paulsen began as the general contractor. At the request of 
Marshall, Ellsworth Paulsen added a partner, Bud Bailey Construction ("BBC"), to 
the construction team. After the loan closed, Big-D Construction Corp. ("Big-D") 
replaced BBC in a joint venture with Ellsworth Paulsen ("EP/BIG-D JV"). EP/Big-D 
JV served as the general contractor for the construction of the project and 
subcontracted with a majority of the other contractors. A few of the Claimants, 
such as the architect, contracted directly with the Property owner. 
Appellant United Western Bank is the successor to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, which was the successor to BankFirst and Marshall. In 
January 2005, BankFirst was acquired by Marshall which later changed the 
holding company name to Marshall BankFirst Corp. and then later simply to 
BankFirst. All of Marshall BankFirst Corp. entities, including the Marshall Group, 
Inc., Marshall Investments Corp., Marshall BankFirst Corp., and BankFirst, are 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
referred to collectively as "BankFirst." It was Marshall Investments Corporation 
and BankFirst that provided financing for the construction of Midtown Village 
Project. United Western Bank, Marshall and BankFirst are referred to collectively 
herein as the "Bank". 
The District Court found that Claimants' mechanic's lien claims had priority 
over the construction trust deed filed by the Bank. The District Court based its 
order on the absence of any disputed material facts, the plain reading of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-5 and the judicial determination of "commencement" from Utah's 
highest courts dating back decades - holding that mechanics' liens relate back to 
and attach as of the date of commencement of first work on an improvement and 
shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or encumbrance attached subsequently 
in time. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Following the suspension of construction work on the Project in February 
2008, the contractors who provided construction services and material 
("Claimants"), recorded mechanic's lien notices in the office of the Utah County 
Recorder. Starting May 16, 2008, the Claimants began filing lien foreclosure 
actions, which were subsequently consolidated with the first-filed action. 
«; 
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On April 9, 2009, EP/Big-D JV and several other Claimants filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment.2 This motion was later joined by the other Claimants.3 
By their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Claimants sought a 
determination that visible commencement of work on the ground took place prior to 
June 15, 2005, the date of the recording of the first trust deed by BankFirst. The 
Claimants also sought a determination that pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-5, the 
Claimants' mechanics' liens related back to and attached as of the date of 
commencement of first work on the ground and therefore with the legal effect of 
giving the Claimant's priority over the subsequently filed Bank trust deed. 
Following the filing of the Motion (April 9, 2009), the parties stipulated to 
proceed with discovery necessary for the Bank to respond to the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Thereafter, the Bank filed its memorandum in opposition to 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 31, 2009.4 On September 9, 
2009, Claimants filed a reply memorandum in support of their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment.5 
Following the completion of briefing, the District Court heard oral argument 
on April 23, 2010. At the close of the argument the District Court orally announced 
its decision to grant the motion. The District Court determined that, because it was 
2
 See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R. 1360-1665]. 
3
 See various notices of joinder [R. 2115-19, 2220-29, 2440-46, 3221-25, 4208-
16,4609-16]. 
4
 See Opposition Memorandum [R. 4976-5059]. 
5
 See Reply Memorandum [R.5337-5507; 5507 A]. 
fi Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
undisputed that substantial excavation occurred on the Midtown Village site 
starting in late 2004, "as a matter of law the commencement of work did occur in 
the fall 2004 timeframe."6 The District Court went on to conclude that all of the 
work performed on Midtown Village was part of a single project, with a common 
plan that was not materially abandoned.7 Finally, the District Court stated that it 
was "disregarding the facts the Bank moved to strike with the exception" of 
"considering title insurance only for the purpose of showing notice, having nothing 
to do with negligence and never having looked at any policies or commitments."8 
On June 22, 2010, the District Court entered a Corrected Order granting 
Claimants motion for partial summary judgment and an Order denying Bank's 
Motion to Strike.9 
The Bank sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal on July 7, 2010.1C 
The Utah Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and transferred the appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals on August 6, 2010.11 
6
 See Corrected Order [R.7848-7857] attached hereto as Second Addendum to 
the Brief; Transcript, at p. 64 [R.8538]. 
7
 See Id. 
8
 See Corrected Order [R.7848-78-57]; Id., pp. 64-70 [R.8538] attached hereto as 
Second Addendum to the Brief. 
9
 See Corrected Order [R.7848-57] attached hereto as Second Addendum to the 
Brief, Order [R.7845-47] attached hereto as Third Addendum to the Brief. 
10
 See Petition for Permission to Appeal [R.7999-8000]. 
11
 See Order [R.8344] attached hereto as Third Addendum to the Brief. 
7 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The term "undisputed material facts" is pivotal to this case. In this case 
there are no disputed material facts, only a dispute between the legal application of 
those undisputed material facts that are material to the application of Utah Code § 
38-1-5 in establishing Claimant's priority interest. The Bank, in its Brief, has not 
set out the material facts that are needed in order to resolve the issues brought by 
this appeal. Many of the facts are cited out of context. Others are mixed with 
inaccurate statements of law. Still other statements of fact are inaccurate and are 
not supported by the record. For these reasons, Claimants dispute the Bank's 
entire Statement of Facts and in its place provide the Court with its own statement 
which Claimants believe to be accurate and supported by the record of this case. 
I. Statement of Facts as to the Excavation. 
1. The Developer obtained a loan commitment letter from Marshall and paid a 
$15,000 good faith deposit in August 2004. Shortly thereafter the Developer 
received an unsecured loan for $562,000 from Marshall. The Developer then 
directed Claimants to proceed with certain required excavations for the Main 
Building. The Developer commenced excavation on the Project for, among other 
reasons, to complete excavations before winter and to show the City of Orem, 
buyers of pre-sold condos and others that the Project was a reality.12 
12
 The $562,000 loan was paid off from the BankFirst loan proceeds in June 
2005; Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R. 5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. More than $800,000 worth of excavation work for the south wing of the 
building was performed in late 2004 which work created a massive hole with 
dimensions of approximately 400' in length, 150' in width and 22' in depth. This 
massive excavation was the first construction work to be performed in connection 
with the Project. The excavation on the ground was a necessary component that 
would enable all other construction to take place. The purpose of this massive 
excavated hole was for the mat footing and underground parking structure for the 
south wing/tower of the Main Building. A second substantial hole for the north 
wing was also excavated in late 2004 and early 2005.13 The construction on the 
ground also made it possible to continue with the other necessary components of 
construction work that were eventually performed. 
3. The excavation work was visible to anyone that visited the Project site 
before the loan closed. Those who visited the Project site and witnessed the 
massive excavation included notably a representative of Marshall and the 
representative of the Equity Title handling the loan closing. The representative of 
Deposition Exhibits 14,153,181,182; Larry MylerDepo., 26:22 to 27:17; 29:1-7; 
150:15-24 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23-25 to 37:18; 65:1-9 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Brett Harris Depo., 120:7 to 121:10 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"2"]. 
13
 Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Larry 
MylerDepo., 31:17-23; 32:6-12 (hole is 12 foot deep); 41:8 to 43:18; 43:9-18; 
61:6-25; 114:5-13; 202:14-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Deposition Exhibit 96; Brett 
Harris Depo., 110:14 to 111:7; 111:16-24; 112:24 to 113:2; 115; 116:7-11 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]; Gary Reynolds Depo., 60:17-20; 65:16-24; 138:18 to 
141:3 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "6"]. 
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Equity Title performed a site investigation and then completed the Mechanics 
Lien Risk Analysis form for the Title Company.14 
4. The BankFirst trust deed for the $42 million loan was recorded on June 17, 
2005.15 From the first proceeds of this loan, costs were paid the Claimants in 
excess of $800,000 for the excavation, shoring and supervision work they 
performed on the Project in late 2004 and early 2005, prior to the recordation of 
the trust deed.16 
5. The payment of the $800,000+ for the construction excavation work 
occurred after recordation of the trust deed. It is undisputed that the $42 million 
BankFirst construction loan, was intended for and used for the building of the 
Project, including further and extensive work on the premises by Lien 
Claimants.17 The $800,000 construction excavation work was included in the 
schedule of value used by the Bank as part of the loan documents.18 
14
 Deposition Exhibits 96,165; Jim Krumm Depo., 96:2 to 99:11 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "3"]; Larry Myler Depo., 31:17-23; 32:6-12; 43:9-18; 61:6-25; 114:5-13; 
202:14-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Adella Pearson Depo., 50:21-25; 58:25 to 
59:9; 61:5-20; 58:25 to 61:21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
15
 Deposition Exhibit 161; Larry Myler Depo., 63 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
16
 "Admitted" - Admission 17 in BankFirst response to the Request for 
Admissions by Big-D, et. a/., dated June 16, 2009 said admission being made 
after a recitation of general objections to the request; Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim 
Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
17
 Larry Myler Depo., 139:5-8 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
18
 Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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(I. Statement of Facts that the Project was Not Materially 
Abandoned. 
1. There was no material change in the owner. Mr. Larry Myler was the 
developer of The Midtown Village Project and was the contact person for each of 
the entities involved in developing the Project including Western Oasis, Tower 
Development Services, Midtown LLC, and ultimately the Midtown Village Joint 
Venture, a successor to the interests of the other entities.19 
2. There was no change in the lender. Marshall and BankFirst was the 
lender that worked with the Developer from July of 2004 until BankFirst funded 
the loan in June of 2005.20 
3. Marshall did not materially abandon its efforts to provide the construction 
loan. In fact, not only did the Bank (Marshall) not abandon its efforts but the Bank 
(Marshall) (1) provided the Developer with a loan commitment letter for the 
Project in August 2004;21 (2) required from the Developer a $15,000 good faith 
deposit for the Project loan in August of 2004;22 (3) arranged for a loan advance 
to the developer of $562,000 in unsecured funds to permit the Developer to 
19
 See Exhibits "B" & "C" of the Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment [R.5337-5507]; Larry Myler Depo., 116:25 to 118:3; 136:2-6; 
152:15 to 154:12; 155:10-13 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
20
 Deposition Exhibits 181,155, 184,186,187,189, 193; Jim Krumm Depo., 34:21 
to 35:11; 44:24 to 45:9; 46:3-21; 56:24 to 57:5; 70:14 to 71:6; 77:11-22; 78:6 to 
79:10; 86:8-15; 86:5-10 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
21
 Deposition Exhibit 181; Jim Krumm Depo., 27 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
22
 Deposition Exhibit 183; Jim Krumm Depo., 39:10-23) [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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commence excavating for the Project in September 2004;23 (4) developed and 
created its marketing package in September 2004 and began acquiring 
subscriptions from participant banks in October 2004;24 (5) persisted in its efforts 
to finance the Project until it succeeded in having the loan closed in June of 
2005;25 (6) acquired subscriptions from participant banks in October and 
November of 2004;26 (7) required and approved a stronger guarantor for the 
Developer to improve the marketing package in December of 2004;27 (8) 
maintained existing participant banks while it continued working on the financing 
for the Project, (9) issued an updated solicitation package in the spring of 2005 
and (10) acquired subscriptions from additional participant banks in 2005 (1 in 
January; 8 in March; 7 in April; 4 in May; and 8 in June).28 
4. At all material times the Project architect was Ken Harris Architects and the 
General Contractor was Ellsworth Paulsen Construction or a joint venture 
23
 Deposition Exhibits 153,182; Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23 to 37:18; 65:1-9 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Larry MylerDepo., 26:22 to 27:17 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
24
 Deposition Exhibits 184,185,186,187; Jim Krumm Depo., 42,45,48,51 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "3"]. 
25
 Deposition Exhibits187,188; Jim Krumm Depo., 51, 54 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
26
 Deposition Exhibits 184,185,186,187; Jim Krumm Depo., 42,45,48,51 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "3"]. 
27
 Deposition Exhibit 188, Email dated Dec. 18, 2004; Jim Krumm Depo., 54 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
28
 Deposition Exhibits 185,186,187,188; Jim Krumm Depo., 45,48,51,54 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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including Ellsworth Paulsen Construction. 
5. At all relevant times, the Project was not materially changed. The Project 
has always been a mixed use project with a Main Building situated in a "U" shape 
consisting of South, North and West wings with a central courtyard surrounding 
an Icon Tower.30 The Project was to have underground parking with 
approximately 98,000 square feet of retail on the first floors; 106,000 square feet 
of office space on the second floors; and 243 residential condominiums on the 
third through seventh floors. More than 50% of the 243 residential condos had 
been pre-sold and more than 50% of the retail space had been pre-leased, 
before and while, the Bank was marketing the financing package to participant 
banks.31 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its appeal brief, the Bank is specifically asking this Court to change Utah's 
current legal standard that excavation qualifies as commencement of work. 
Appellants are asking this Court to change the rule of established law and 
standard and create a new standard that commencement of work occurs when 
29
 Deposition Exhibits 4,18,19,155, 181,193; Allen Washburn Depo., 48,91,94 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]; Larry MylerDepo., 35; 89:25 to 90:19; 90:20-24 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 27,120 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
30
 See Project site plan attached hereto as Fourth Addendum to the Brief 
[R.5337-5507, Exhibit "D"]. 
31
 Deposition Exhibits 115; Brett Harris Depo., 227 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]; 
Deposition Exhibits 181,189,193; Jim Krumm Depo., 27, 91,120 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "3"]. 
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concrete for the footings or foundation is poured. The facts are not in dispute; only 
the legal standard by which the term "commencement of work" is defined is at 
issue. The District Court correctly ruled that the material facts in this case were 
undisputed and that pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-5 the Claimants' mechanics' 
liens related back to and attached as of the date of commencement of first work 
(excavation work) and therefore have priority over the subsequently filed trust deed 
of the Bank. The District Court was correct in its application of the correct legal 
standard when it defined "commencement of work" to include the Claimants' 
substantial excavation work. 
The central critical issue of what constitutes the first "visible construction 
work" is placed before this Court. There are no disputed factual issues 
concerning the massive 400' wide, 150' long, and 22' deep excavation for the 
mat footing and underground parking for the south tower of the Main Building for 
the Project. The Bank labels that massive excavation as "mere site preparation 
work." However, this massive excavation went far beyond what courts have held 
as "mere site preparation work." 
Any project construction must begin in the ground, with excavations for the 
footings and for underground facilities, such as basements and parking 
structures. Such excavation work was part of every contract in this case, and 
was designated on the schedule of values accompanying the general 
14 
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contractors' contracts. There is no disputed fact that the Bank, and its title 
company handling the loan closing, were fully aware that excavation for the 
Project had commenced months before the Bank recorded its deed of trust on 
June 15,2005. In fact, Jim Krumm ("Krumm"), the vice-president of 
Marshall/BankFirst and the originator of the loan with the developer, visited the 
Project while working on the loan package in the spring of 2005 (a few months 
before the loan closed) and personally observed the large excavated hole on the 
Project. Additionally, Adella Pearson ("Pearson"), Vice-President at Equity Title 
Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Equity Title") who handled the loan closing, personally 
inspected the premises and observed the large excavation prior to June 15, 
2005. In fact, at the request of First American Title Company (the "Title 
Company"), Pearson completed a Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis in which she 
informed the Title Company that "excavation had begun." 
The Bank attempts to create disputed facts to explain that the Project was 
"materially abandoned." In this attempt, the Bank is wholly unsuccessful. In fact, 
nothing in the exhibits and testimony of this case demonstrates any material 
abandonment of the Project. The Developer (and the companies he utilized to 
develop the Project) testified he never abandoned the project. Equally 
compelling is that the Bank, the defendant raising the material abandonment 
defense, did not abandon its own efforts to provide the $42 million construction 
\ 
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loan. In fact, not only did the Bank not abandon its efforts but the Bank provided 
loan commitment letters, received good faith deposits, facilitated the advance of 
unsecured funds to commence excavating, marketed the loan package, acquired 
participant banks in 2004, persisted in its efforts to finance the Project with a 
revised loan package until it succeeded in having the loan closed, approved a 
stronger guarantor to improve the marketing package, maintained existing 
participant banks and acquired subscriptions from additional twenty-eight 
participant banks in 2005.32 
The Bank never materially abandoned its efforts to finance the Project and 
eventually, together with the participating banks, approved the Project financing. 
Simply put, it strains all reason for the Bank to argue before this Court there was 
a "material abandonment" of the Project. The Bank cannot point to any 
testimony of any witness or any document that states that the project was 
abandoned. The testimony of all of the witnesses demonstrated that they did not 
abandon the Project. 
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion and considered nothing 
that was irrelevant or inadmissible when it considered the existence of title 
insurance solely for the purpose of showing actual notice to the title company that 
excavation had commenced. 
32
 A list of the participant banks with the dates they subscribed is attached hereto 
as Fifth Addendum to the Brief [R.5337-5507, Appendix "A"]. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly ruled that the material facts in this case are 
undisputed. Further, the District Court applied the correct legal standards when it 
ruled that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 the Claimants' mechanics' liens 
relate back to and attached as of the date of commencement of first work. Finally, 
the District Court properly concluded that the mechanic's liens therefore have 
priority over the subsequently filed trust deeds of the Bank. 
Despite the Bank's protestations to the contrary, there are no disputed 
material facts. Previously the Bank attempted to disguise legal argument as 
"disputed fact", selectively citing deposition testimony; and selectively presenting 
undisputed facts out of sequence and context to appear as disputed. Despite 
those attempts, the District Court correctly ruled that the Claimants have priority 
over the Bank's trust deed. At present, the Bank is once again attempting the 
same approach by disguising legal argument as "disputed facts." It is the intent of 
the Claimants to demonstrate that despite the Bank's protestations to the contrary 
there are still no disputed material facts and the District Court ruled correctly. 
Contrary to the Banks argument, this Project was a single project with a 
common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness. There was no material 
change in the owner of the Project. There was no change in the architect of the 
Project. There was no material change in the general contractor of the Project. 
17 
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There was no change in the lender to the Project. In summary, there was no 
material change in the Project. 
Finally no one - not even the Bank itself - abandoned the Project. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the District Court granting 
Claimants a priority interest in the property to which their mechanic's lien claims 
attach. 
I. THE BANK'S ATTEMPT TO CHANGE UTAH'S ESTABLISHED LEGAL 
PRECEDENT GOVERNING EXCAVATION AS COMMENCEMENT OF 
WORK SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "[tjhose asking us to overturn prior 
precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion."33 The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "we will not overturn precedent unless clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing 
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent."34 
Utah's statutory law provides a mechanics' lien for contractors such as 
Claimant's that perform construction services in the improvement of land.35 The 
established legal precedent regarding the priority of a mechanics' lien with 
respect to other encumbrances, such as a deed of trust, is governed by § 38-1-5 
of the Utah Code which provides in pertinent part: 
33
 Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021 (Utah 2002). 
34
 Id., at 1021. 
35
 See Utah Code §38-1-3. 
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[Mechanics' liens] shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time 
of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached 
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground. 
To determine the priority date of a mechanics' lien against another 
encumbrance, the Court must look to the "commencement to do work" test.36 An 
examination of the cases decided in Utah reveals that "actual excavation for the 
foundation" of a building is commencement of work for the purpose of 
determining priority of mechanic's liens.37 
* See Utah Code §38-1-5. 
37
 E.W. Allen & Associates, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1504 
(Utah 1991); EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 122 P.3d 646 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005); CalderBros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 923 n. 1 (Utah 1982) 
("Generally, the presence of building materials upon the land or other visible 
evidence of work performed provides notice to any interested party that work has 
commenced."); Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr., 18 Utah 
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967) ("The presence of materials on the building 
site or evidence on the ground that work has commenced on a structure or 
preparatory thereto is notice to all the world that liens may have attached."); First 
of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979); 
Ketchum Konkel v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217,1224 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Davis-Wellcome Mortgage Co. v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 184 Kan. 
202, 336 P.2d 463, 466 (1959); This common statutory and case law approach is 
consistent with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. See Bruner & 
O'Connor on Construction Law, 8:129; 8:146; 8:147; 1 A.L.R. 3d 822 § 6 ("It has 
been recognized in the following cases applying lien statutes providing in effect 
that the lien accrues at the time the work on the building commences, that at 
least the digging of the cellar or the excavating for the foundation amounts to the 
commencement of the building, and the mechanics' liens accrue at that time..."). 
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In its appeal brief, the Bank specifically asks this Court to change Utah's 
long standing precedent defining excavation as the commencement of work on a 
construction project. The Bank is asking this Court to establish a new standard 
whereby the commencement of work would not be the actual excavation for the 
building's foundation. The Bank has asked the Court to establish a new standard 
by which the commencement of work would occur further into the project; i.e., 
when the actual concrete is poured for the footings and foundations within that 
excavation. The Bank seeks to do this even in view of the fact that its own loan 
documents and payment records provide for the payment of excavation work as 
part of the loan closing and construction process.38 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Bank has failed to meet the 
substantial burden of persuasion that is necessary for this shift in Utah's 
established legal precedent defining excavation as the commencement of work 
on a construction project. 
II. THE BANK ATTEMPT TO CHANGE UTAH'S ESTABLISHED LEGAL 
PRECEDENT GOVERNING MATERIAL ABANDONMENT SHOULD BE 
REJECTED. 
Again, under the doctrine of stare decisis, "[tjhose asking us to overturn 
prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion."39 The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that "we will not overturn precedent unless clearly convinced 
38
 Deposition Exhibits 19, 21; Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]; 
Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
39
 Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021 (Utah 2002). 
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that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing 
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent."40 
Utah's case law provides that it can be a "complex" evaluation to 
determine whether or not a construction project has been "materially abandoned" 
because of the need to review all of the facts relating to the question of why a 
project may have been abandoned or temporarily halted.41 
In its appeal brief, the Bank specifically asks this Court to change Utah's 
current established standard of defining whether or not a construction project has 
been materially abandoned. The Bank asks this Court to establish a new 
standard that the intent to abandon or continue work be determined from strictly 
visible site conditions, not from any review of the many activities away from the 
project site. 
Utah's established legal precedent of determining whether or not a 
construction project has been materially abandoned comes from a complete 
review of the activities relating to the project including an inquiry into intention. 
Utah courts review the totality of circumstances and project activities both on and 
4U/d.,at1021. 
41
 Ketchum Konkel v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217,1225 (Utah 
Ct. App.1989); citing Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 270 Md. 152, 311 
A.2d 780 (1973); Brettschneider&Wellman, 230 Minn. 225, 41 N.W. 2d 255 
(1950). 
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off the project site in determining whether or not there has been material 
abandonment.42 
To support its request for this shift in legal precedence, the Bank cites to a 
case from Minnesota - Langford Tool & Drill Co. v. Phenix Biocomposites - a 
case which has not been cited or followed in any Utah decision dealing with the 
definition of material abandonment. The Bank would have the Utah courts adopt 
what the Langford court refers to (but never adopts) as the "Kansas Rule" rather 
than the "Oregon rule" or some combination of the two rules. The line of 
authority cited by the Bank, in addition to being over a century old, is inapplicable 
since Utah does not follow the so-called "Kansas Rule." 
Utah's legal precedent is in fact much different than the "Kansas Rule" 
discussed in the Langford case. Utah's courts have looked not only at the 
activities on the project site but also at all activities dealing with a construction 
project to determine if a "material abandonment" has occurred. In fact, in the 
Utah cases which have opined on the subject of abandonment, the Courts have 
looked at and cited to cases which examined facts relating to such off site 
activities as efforts to obtain construction financing, efforts to obtain a bond, 
efforts to obtain state approval for the project, sales of the property, change in 
contractors, comparison of plans for the project, and all other consistent, 
42
 Ketchum Konkel v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). 
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continuous and diligent activities to proceed to completion in determining if a 
project was materially abandoned.43 
This Court in Ketchum cited Klien that "in order to determine whether a 
material abandonment has occurred, an inquiry into intention must be 
43
 Ketchum Konkel v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217,1225 (Utah 
Ct. App.1989) (citing Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 270 Md. 152, 311 
A.2d 780 (1973) (The Klein court found that, although there was a significant 
cessation of work, it was due to reasons not unheard of in construction - loss of 
financing, failure to get a bond, state approval, and project went ahead with little 
change in the original plans; the issue more correctly stated is whether there has 
been sufficient cessation of work to constitute the end of construction on one 
project and the initiation of work on another project); Brettschneider & Wellman, 
230 Minn. 225, 41 N.W. 2d 255 (1950) (the fact that a building may be 
temporarily halted does not necessarily mean than abandonment has occurred; 
many things might cause a building project to be temporarily halted, but if there is 
no abandonment or severance of the contract it may still be entire and 
continuous in nature within the contemplation of the statute); In the Nu-Trend 
Electric, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (the Court recited as facts many offsite activities such as 
transfers of property, sales of property, change in contractor, comparison of 
plans in subjectively reviewing material abandonment); Eastern & Western 
Lumber Co. v. Williams, 129 Or. 1, 276 P. 257, 259 (Facts which will constitute 
an abandonment must include a conclusion, upon the part of the participants, to 
cease operations permanently, or at least for an indefinite period. Thus a mere 
cessation of labor is not an abandonment. The setting of the sun generally 
causes a cessation of labor for the night; unfavorable weather conditions may 
halt construction for a longer period; similar interruptions may come from labor 
troubles or the lack of materials. In each of these instances, no one has 
concluded to abandon the project. Similarly, the lack of money caused a 
cessation of work, but was unaccompanied with a conclusion to abandon the 
project.); Stark-Davis Co. v. Fellows etal., 129 Or. 281, 277 P. 110, 112 (In order 
to constitute a permanent abandonment of the construction of the building,..., 
there should be a cessation of operation, and an intent on the part of the owner 
and contractor to cease operations permanently, or at least for an indefinite 
period, or some fair notice to or knowledge of the abandonment by a lien 
claimant, either actual or implied). 
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made."44 This intent is not a secretive intent, but is to be an objective 
manifestation of intent as cited by this Court in Ketchum.45 This Court further 
stated that this is a "complex inquiry"46 because it looks at all project activities 
instead of the oversimplified approach favored by the Bank of a simple site 
observation. Utah courts have reviewed the totality of circumstances and project 
activities both on and off the project site in determining whether or not there has 
been material abandonment. 
In determining material abandonment Utah courts have looked at the 
manifest intent of the parties. The manifested intent whether or not to abandon a 
project is not a secretive intent but is evaluated by considering all of the activities 
that are occurring both on and off the project site. 
It confounds all reason for the Bank to argue that this Project was 
materially abandoned with the Bank admittedly never abandoned its efforts to 
provide financing for the Project. While it took the Bank several months longer to 
obtain all of the subscriptions to the loan package to fund the total loan amount, 
the Bank did successfully complete the loan financing. The Bank is not a new 
innocent lender which came into the Project midstream - it was there throughout 
all relevant times. The principal cause of the temporary halt to on site work on 
44
 Ketchum Konkel v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1226 (Utah 
Ct. App.1989). 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
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the Project was the delay in the Bank providing the financing. As stated, the 
Bank was the party working with the Developer the entire time to get financing for 
the Project. While the Bank and Developer were working on finalizing the 
financing, the other parties to the Project including the architect, the general 
contractor, many subcontractors, Orem City, the real estate agents continued 
working on the Project. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Bank has failed to meet its 
substantial burden of persuasion that is necessary for this shift in Utah's 
established legal precedent of determining whether or not a construction project 
has been materially abandoned from a complete review of the activities relating 
to the project including an inquiry into intention to a new standard that material 
abandonment is determined from the results of only a simple site visit without any 
inquiry into intention. 
III. SUBSTANTIAL VISIBLE WORK UNDISPUTEDLY COMMENCED ON 
THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE TRUST DEED'S RECORDING ON 
JUNE 17, 2005. 
In its Order, the District Court held that the mechanic's liens of the 
Claimants had priority over the Bank's trust deed because it concluded that 
visible construction work on the Midtown Village Project ("Project") commenced 
prior to the recording of the Bank's trust deed. The Court also held that the 
undisputed facts supported the conclusion that the Project was not materially 
25 
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abandoned from the time the excavation work commenced in the fall of 2004 to 
the time the $42 million loan closed and the trust deed was recorded in June 
2005 as required by Utah Code § 38-1-5.47 
The District Court based its conclusion on the undisputed facts that (1) 
excavation work was performed at the Property beginning in September 2004 
through early 2005; (2) the dimension of the excavation work performed in late 
2004 was approximately 400' in length, 150' in width and 22' in width; (3) the 
excavated hole was for the footings and underground parking structure for the 
south wing of the Project; (4) a second hole for the north wing of the Project was 
also excavated in late 2004 and early 2005; (5) some of the soil slopes of the 
excavation were stabilized with gunite and soil nails; (6) the excavation work was 
readily visible to anyone that visited the Project site; (7) the excavation for the 
mat foundation and footings and the underground parking became part of the 
overall work of improvement for the Project; (8) the Bank's construction deed of 
trust to secure its loan in the amount of $42 million was recorded on June 17, 
2005; (9) before the loan closed both a representative of the Bank and a 
representative of Equity Title Company, who was handling the loan closing, 
actually observed the excavation work identified above; and (10) prior to the loan 
closing, on June 17, 2005, the representative of Equity Title Company completed 
47
 See Corrected Order, at p. 2-3 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum 
to the Brief. 
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a form entitled "Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis" indicating that in her opinion, 
based upon her inspection of the site, excavation work on the improvement had 
commenced and that lien claimants existed.48 
By its Order, the District Court further held that the excavation and 
stabilization of the gigantic foundation pit was not "mere site preparation" but was 
instead "visible construction work" constituting a "commencement of work" as 
required for priority purposes under Utah Code § 38-1-5. 
Accordingly, each of these determinations by the District Court is correct 
and should be affirmed. 
IV. VISIBLE CONSTRUCTION IS COMMENCEMENT TO DO WORK FOR 
PRIORITY PURPOSES OF MECHANICS LIENS UNDER UTAH CODE § 
38-1-5. 
A. Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute is to be Broadly Construed in 
Favor of Lien Claimants. 
As this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly explained, the 
requirement that there be "commencement to do work" is construed broadly and 
in favor of lien claimants.49 In accordance with this broad reading of the 
mechanic's lien statutes, the excavation and stabilization of the massive 
See Corrected Order, at p. 2-4 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum 
to the Brief. 
49
 See, e.g. CalderBros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982); 
Ketchum v. Heritage Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217,1220 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); See 
Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum to the 
Brief. 
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foundation pit in the fall of 2004 and early 2005 was clearly visible construction 
work constituting the "commencement of work" as required for priority purposes 
under Utah Code § 38-1-5. 
The effect of filing a mechanics' lien pursuant to the terms of Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-1 et al. is that it gives constructive notice to the world that the lien 
claimant has maintained a secured claim against the property which has been 
improved by the lien claimant's work and materials. According to Utah Code § 
38-1-5, the contractor's lien claim takes effect when the first visible construction 
work gives a reasonable person notice that the value of the land is being 
enhanced as the result of the construction of buildings, structures and/or 
improvements furnished by contractors and design professionals. 
Utah courts have held that "[t]he presence of building materials upon the 
land or other visible evidence of work performed provides notice to any interested 
party that work has commenced."50 The unique aspect of a mechanics' lien is 
that commencement of visible work is treated as imparting constructive notice of 
a potential mechanics' lien claim.51 Under Utah law, there exists a general test of 
M
 CalderBros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). 
51
 See First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel &Assoc's., 600 P.2d 
521 (Utah 1979); see also Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 
612 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) (commencement of 
visible construction work is treated as imparting constructive notice of mechanics' 
lien). 
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commencement for purposes of determining the priority date of a mechanics lien 
vis-a-vis a construction lender.52 
In Calder Bros. v. Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that "visible 
evidence of work provides evidence to any interested party of commencement."5^ 
The Federal District Court for Utah in E. W. Allen & Associates v. FDIC held that 
"the work must be in the form of an improvement that is visible to the extent that 
a reasonable person using reasonable diligence would be able to see that work 
was underway."54 In Ketchum v. Heritage Mountain, the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that Utah case law emphasizes visible work performed on the property or 
the presence of materials, giving notice that work has commenced on the 
property.55 
B. The District Court Based its Ruling of Priority on Undisputed 
Facts and Established Legal Precedent Governing Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Law. 
Throughout its Brief the Bank claims the District Court impermissibly 
weighed evidence. There were, however, absolutely no material facts in dispute. 
w
 E.W. Allen & Associates, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1504 
(1991). 
53
 Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) ("Evidence on 
the ground that work has commenced on a structure or preparatory thereto is 
notice to all the world that liens may have attached."); See Western Mortgage v. 
Cottonwood Construction Company, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1967). 
54
 E W. Allen & Associates v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (1991). 
55
 Ketchum Konkel, Barret, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 
P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah App. 1989). 
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There are several key undisputed facts which summarize the Bank's involvement 
in the commencement of work on the Project in the fall of 2004: 
1. It is the undisputed testimony of the Developer, that he (a) 
obtained a loan commitment letter from the Bank; (b) gave the Bank 
a $15,000 good faith deposit in August 2004; (c) received an 
unsecured loan for $562,000 from the Bank (Marshall Bank, an 
affiliate of BankFirst); and (d) directed contractors to proceed with 
the required excavation for the Project, for among other reasons, to 
complete excavation before winter and to show the City of Orem, 
buyers of pre-sold condos and others that the Project was a reality.56 
2. The $800,000 worth of excavation work performed in late 
2004 created a massive pit with dimensions of approximately 400' in 
length, 150' in width and 22' in depth; this massive excavated hole 
was for the mat footing and underground parking structure for the 
south wing of the Main Building; a second substantial hole for the 
north wing was also excavated in late 2004 and early 2005.57 
3. The excavation work was visible to anyone that visited the 
Project site before the loan closed including notably a representative 
of the Bank and the representative of the Equity Title handling the 
&b
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-6, 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief; the $562,000 loan was paid off from the BankFirst loan 
proceeds in June 2005. Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo.,102 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "3"]; Deposition Exhibits 14,153,181,182; Larry Myler Depo., 26:22-27 
to 27:17; 29:1-7; 150:15-24 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23-25 
to 37:18; 65:1-9 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Brett Harris Depo., 120:7 to 121:10 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]. 
57
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-6, 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief, Deposition Exhibit 190, Jim Krumm Depo.,102 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "3"]; Larry Myler Depo., 43:9-18; 61:6-25; 114:5-13; 31:17-23; 32:6-12 
(hole is 12 foot deep); 202:14-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Deposition Exhibit 96; 
Brett Harris Depo.,115 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]; Gary Reynolds Depo., 60:17-20; 
65:16-24; 138:18 to 141:3 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "6"]; Larry Myler Depo., 41:8 to 
43:18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Brett Harris Depo., 110:14 to 111:7; 111: 6-24; 
112:24 to 113:2; 116:7-11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]. 
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loan closing who completed the Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form 
for the Title Company.58 
4. The Bank trust deed for the $42 million loan was recorded on 
June 17, 2005. From the first proceeds of this loan, costs in excess 
of $800,000 for the massive excavation, shoring and supervision 
work performed on the Project in late 2004 and early 2005 were 
paid.59 As part of the loan closing and payment a release was 
obtained for the mechanics lien filed by Wadsworth for the amounts 
owed for the guniting and soil nailing work to stabilize some of the 
excavated slopes. 
5. The funding occurring after recordation of the trust deed to 
secure the $42 million the Bank construction loan, was intended for, 
and was used for the building of the Project, including further and 
extensive work on the premises by the contractors.60 
Construction work was commenced on the Project by excavator Reynolds 
Brothers Construction ("Reynolds") on September 24, 2004. There is no dispute 
that Reynolds billed the Developer $657,397.59 for excavation work performed in 
late 2004 and early 2005.61 In addition, Wadsworth Construction billed 
w
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-6, 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief; Deposition Exhibits 96,165; Jim Krumm Depo., P.96:2 to 
99:11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Larry Myler, Depo., 43:9-18; 61:6-25; 114:5-13; 
31:17-23; 32:6-12; 202:14-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Adella Pearson Depo., 
50:21-25; 59:25 to 60:9; 61:5-20; 58:25 to 61:21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
59
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-6, 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief, Deposition Exhibit 161; Larry MylerDepo., 63 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "4"]; "Admitted" - Admission 17 in BankFirst response to the Request for 
Admissions by Big-D, et. a/., dated June 16, 2009 said admission being made 
after a recitation of general objections to the request [R. 4670]; Deposition Exhibit 
190; Jim Krumm Depo., P.102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
60
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-6, 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief, Larry MylerDepo., 139:5-8 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
61
 Deposition Exhibit 16, p.11; Allen Washburn Depo., 79 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]; 
Deposition Exhibit 81; Gary Reynolds Depo., 100 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "6"]. 
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$157,079.31 for its shoring work performed to stabilize the side slopes of portions 
of the massive foundation pit.62 There is also no dispute that the foregoing 
amounts for the commenced excavations were paid at the closing by the Bank 
from the initial funding of the $42 million loan.63 
Despite these undisputed facts, the Bank petitions this Court to reject 
decades of Utah jurisprudence determining what constitutes commencement of 
work under Utah Code § 38-1-5. The Bank is asking this Court to now hold that 
commencement to do work only takes place when the concrete footings or 
foundation are constructed.64 The Bank does not point to any other courts in the 
country that have held that excavation work is insufficient work and that the 
pouring of actual concrete is the appropriate standard for commencement of 
visible work. Further, the Bank also fails to cite to any case in the country which 
holds that the Project's massive excavation for a mat footing for the building 
structures and for the underground parking constitutes "mere site preparation 
work."65 Instead the Bank improperly and erroneously characterizes and labels 
bZ
 Deposition Exhibit 147; Tod Wadsworth Depo., 87:25-88:20. 
63
 Deposition Exhibit 190, P. 3; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
64
 The Bank wants this court to conclude that no matter the volume of earth 
removed during excavation it does not amount to "commencement of work." 
65
 Bruner & O'Connor on Construction Law, 8:129; 8:146; 8:147; 1 A.L.R. 3d 822 
§ 6 ("It has been recognized in the following cases applying lien statutes 
providing in effect that the lien accrues at the time the work on the building 
commences, that at least the digging of the cellar or the excavating for the 
foundation amounts to the commencement of the building, and the mechanics' 
liens accrue at that time..."). 
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the massive excavated pit as "mere site preparation work. No witness or 
expert testified that such substantial excavation and guniting work was "mere site 
preparation work." 
C. The Excavation Work Performed for the Mat Footing and 
Underground Parking is Not Mere "Site Preparation Work" but 
Constitutes Commencement of Visible Work. 
The Bank claims in its brief that the District Court impermissibly weighed 
evidence regarding this issue. However, there were absolutely no material facts 
in dispute. The only dispute is the label that should be given to the excavation 
work. The only way the Bank can get to that argument is by specifically asking 
this Court to change Utah's current legal standard that excavation counts as 
commencement of work to a new standard that commencement does not occur 
until concrete is poured. Ultimately, the label given by the Bank to the excavation 
work is a legal conclusion not a factual matter. 
The Bank misrepresents the holding of E. W. Allen & Associates v. FDIC in 
asserting that the excavation in 2004 at the Project was merely "site preparation 
The Bank attempts to confuse the Court by implying all excavation is the same. 
Not so. Clearing and grubbing excavation work, done to provide a level site to 
commence work, does not give notice. Excavation below grade, for basements, 
underground parking, for footings and foundations, provides notice that work has 
commenced. One-million plus of excavation for the underground parking and 
mat slab and soil nailing and guniting to stabilize the sides of the gigantic 
excavation is not "preconstruction work" or "mere site preparation" as contended 
by the Bank. 
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work and did not constitute "commencement to do work." For example, the 
Bank correctly notes that surface excavation referred to in that case did not 
provide notice to the public, but conspicuously omits the statement of that opinion 
that the digging of a basement does signal the start of work. That Court also 
specifically stated that "excavation for the foundation of a building is 
commencement."68 
Utah law is clear as to what type of work does and does not constitute 
"commencement to do work." In First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. CN Zundel, 
the court held that off-site excavation for a subdivision when such excavation is 
67
 The Bank attempts to raise a fact issue by giving bald conclusive "labels" to the 
nature of the work in place in the fall of 2004, such as calling a $800,000 dollars 
worth of excavating and shoring "mere site preparation work." Site preparation 
work by definition consists of clearing and grubbing and possibly simple surface 
grading of the property, all of which leaves the property in a flat condition which 
would not put a reasonable person inspecting the property on notice that 
construction has commenced. The Claimants who performed the construction 
work and gave value to the Project for which they have not been paid urge the 
Court to look through allegations which the Bank calls "fact issues", but are really 
nothing more than arguments of counsel. When the Court focuses on what the 
witnesses are undisputedly saying, i.e. that a 400 foot hole was present six 
months before the trust deed was recorded, it is clear that while the Bank has 
raised a legal position, it has failed to raise any genuine or disputed facts. 
68
 See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum 
to the Brief; E.W. Allen, 776 F. Supp. at 1509-10; The Bank attempts to confuse 
the Court by implying all excavation is the same. Not so. Clearing and grubbing 
excavation work, done to provide a level site to commence work, does not give 
notice of commencement of construction. Excavation below grade, for 
basements, underground parking, for footings and foundations, provides notice 
that work has commenced. $800,000 plus of excavation for the underground 
parking and mat slab and soil nailing and guniting to stabilize the sides of the 
gigantic excavation is not "preconstruction work" or "mere site preparation" as 
contended by the Bank. 
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of a substantial nature constituted the start of work. E. W. Allen cites a number 
of examples of actions that do not qualify as "commencement to do work" 
including stock piling top soil, leveling and grading. But excavating for a 
basement or foundation does qualify as "commencement to do work." 
In the instant case, the gigantic 22' deep, 400' long and 170' wide 
excavated pit, which served as the excavation for both a footing and the structure 
for underground parking, goes far beyond what other cases (both inside and 
outside of Utah) have held to constitute the first visible construction work. 
In a recent Utah Court of Appeals case cited by the Bank, which is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case, the Court again references the previously-
held principle that staking, surveying, and clearing land was preparatory work 
that did not suggest the existence of some impending or ongoing construction 
project.70 The work performed in EDSA (i.e., staking, surveying, conducting 
studies, and installing minor irrigation parts for some overall improvements not 
actually part of the project itself) is light years away from what occurred in the 
instant case. 
Reynolds Brothers did not merely scrape away some top soil and leave a 
backhoe on site to give the impression that work had begun. Reynolds and 
69
 In First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. CN Zundel, 600 P.2d 521,526 (Utah 
1979). 
70
 See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum 
to the Brief, EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 192 P.3d 296, 300-301 (UT App. 
2008). 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wadsworth engaged in excavation a pit of 400'x200'x22' deep, guniting, and soil-
nailing work the value of which alone was over $800,000. This was work that the 
Bank gave an unsecured loan to commence and later fully paid for when the loan 
closed on June 15, 2005. This was the work that the Bank's title company 
referred to in the Lien Risk Analysis acknowledging the commencement of 
construction.71 The Bank's own inspector referred to the excavation work in its 
first inspection report dated August 18, 2005, stating that "Information provided 
by the Marshall Group (aka BankFirst) in August 2005 indicated that project work 
either completed or in progress includes excavation for parking garages, in 
addition to soft cost work including land acquisition, permits, etc."72 The Bank 
inspector's characterization that the excavation was for the "parking garages" 
was based on the information provided by the Bank itself.73 
The Bank erroneously relies on Diversified Mortgage Investors v. 
Gepada74 and United Lumber v. Minmar Investment75 for the proposition that the 
excavation is not the commencement of work for purposes of the relation back 
doctrine. In fact, those cases hold the exact opposite for what the Bank cites 
them, by clearly signaling that substantial excavation work in the nature of 
71
 Deposition Exhibit, 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
72
 See Exhibit "A" to Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
[R.5337-5507]. 
73
 Id., p.1 [R.5337-5507]. 
74
 Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Gepada, 401 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D. Iowa 
1975). 
75
 United Lumber v. Minmar Investment, 472 S.W. 2d 630 (Mo. App. 1971). 
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footings and basements represents the start of work for purposes of lien priority. 
The vast majority of law from other states is substantially similar to the law in 
Utah and dictates that the type of work performed by Reynolds qualifies as 
"commencement to do work" and is not merely "site preparation."76 
The Bank contends without reference to any authority that there is a 
requirement that actual pouring of concrete for a footing or foundation must77 
occur before lenders are on notice that work has commenced. This contention is 
,b
 See, e.g. Drilling Service Co. Baebler, 484 S.W. 2d 1 Mo. App. 
1972)(Horizontal underground work is the same as vertical structural work for 
purposes of the relation back doctrine, such that site excavation work consisting 
of roads, sewer, and utilities - which were permanent - signaled the start of work); 
Williams Lumber Co. v. Poarch, 428 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1968)(Work on footings 
constituted commencement of work); Woolridge Const. Co., v. First National 
Bank, 634 P.2d 13 (Ariz. 1981) (Construction of the building site pad gave priority 
over later recorded trust deed); Robinson v. Thatcher, 451 P.2d 863, 864 (Or. 
1969)(Excavation of a basement is lienable start of work); Vasquez v. Village 
Center, Inc. 362 S.W. 2d 588 (Mo. 1962)(Site work, such as building pads and 
compaction for footings give priority over a trust deed); Brettschneider v. 
Wellman, 41 N.W. 2d 255 (Minn. 1955)(Excavation of basement is 
commencement of work); Seracuse Lawler & Partner v. Copper Mountain, 654 
P.2d 1328,1331 (Col. App. 1982)(Excavation of underground parking is the start 
of work under the relation back doctrine). 
77
 For example, the Bank states that "visible work commenced on the Project in 
October 2005, when pouring of the footings and parking structure foundation 
began... ." This statement represents nothing more than a legal conclusion, not 
a disputed issue of fact. "Evidence on the ground that work has commenced ... is 
notice to all the world that liens may have attached; See Western Mortgage v. 
Cottonwood Construction Company, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1967). It simply 
stretches credulity to say that a person standing on State Street in Orem in the 
fall of 2004, would not view a concrete-coated football-field size hole as 
construction that had commenced. 
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contradicted by long standing Utah jurisprudence. 8 There is no bright line 
requirement of pouring the concrete for the footings or foundations from the 
excavation for the footing or foundation as is suggested by the Bank.79 In fact, 
the Bank specifically asks this Court to change Utah's current legal standard that 
excavation counts as commencement of work to a new standard that 
commencement occurs when concrete is poured. This the Bank is urging this 
Court to do even in view of the Bank's acknowledgment in the construction loan 
documents and in its payment records that the excavation work was part of the 
construction process.80 
Out of dozens of lien priority cases throughout the country, the Claimants 
have been unable to find a single case where the excavation for a mat footing or 
of a basement, or of an underground structure, such as a parking garage, was 
not held to provide notice to the world that work had commenced. The Bank's 
For example, First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. CN Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 
(Utah 1979), which held that site excavation work did constitute the start of work. 
79
 See generally E.W. Allen, 766 F. Supp 1504; the absurdity of the Bank's 
position can be seen in what is being argued. The Bank contends that if the 
pouring of the footing in the bottom of the massive 25' x 400' x 150' excavated 
hole, would have taken place in the fall of 2004 or early 2005, then "first visible 
work" would have occurred and the Bank would more appropriately be on notice. 
Again, there is no dispute regarding the facts of the excavation. The dispute 
relates solely to the legal conclusion to be drawn from those undisputed facts. 
The legal conclusion is that the excavation of the gigantic holes for the footings 
and underground parking structures is the commencement of the work and 
trumps the later pouring of concrete within that gigantic excavation. 
80
 Deposition Exhibits 19, 21; Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]; 
Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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attempt to equate "clearing and grubbing" with the excavation of a gunite and soil 
nailed jumbo basement is disingenuous at best.81 
V. The Excavation and Shoring Work Performed in 2004 Provided Clear 
Notice that Work had Commenced on the Project.82 
A. The Excavation Work and Shoring Work Furnished Actual and 
Constructive Notice Work had Commenced on the Project. 
In applying Utah law, the U.S. District Court for Utah held that "the work 
must be in the form of an improvement that is visible to the extent that a 
reasonable person using reasonable diligence would be able to see that work 
was underway."83 
It is correct that a notice of commencement provided by visible evidence of 
work at the site constitutes constructive notice that improvements to the land are 
being made that may be subject to a mechanic's lien claim. Compared to 
constructive notice, actual notice is a higher standard. However, what the Bank 
neglects to state in its brief is the fact that in this case actual notice is undisputed 
and constructive notice is apparent to any reasonable observer. In fact, the Bank 
The Bank is asking this Court to conclude that no matter the volume of earth 
removed during excavation it does not amount to "commencement of work." 
82
 In order to not permit the interjection of a fact issue into this summary 
judgment, the lien claimants conceded for purposes of the motion that the work 
on the Icon Tower, while clearly the nerve center of the entire project, did not 
represent the commencement of work on the Main Building. 
83
 See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as Second Addendum 
to the Brief; E.W. Allen & Associates v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504,1509 (1991); 
See also CalderBros., supra.; Western Mortgage v. Cottonwood Construction 
Company, supra.; Ketchum v. Heritage, supra.; Tripp v. Vaughn, supra. 
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- the lender in question - had actual knowledge that the excavation work had 
commenced because they loaned the money for that very purpose. A part of the 
funds loaned by the Bank were used to pay for the excavation work. The Bank's 
also acknowledged the excavation work in the schedule of work values that are 
included in the loan documents.84 The Bank's title company, Equity Title, 
provided a Mechanic's Lien Risk Analysis which documented that "excavation 
had begun" prior to the loan closing.85 The Bank's actual knowledge is 
recognized in the deposition testimony of the Developer: 
Q. Did there come a time when they [Marshall] loaned you some 
money for the project, about $560,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the purpose of that loan? 
A. There was some smaller amounts that were paid to architects, 
engineers, and one larger amount that was paid for excavation of 
the site. 
Q. I think you indicated that you had discussions with them about 
wanting to get the excavation going to beat winter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, is that what you then proceeded to do? 
A. Yes. 
84
 Deposition Exhibits 19, 2V, Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]; 
Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
85
 Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. In the fall - in September of 2004, you didn't have financing in 
place for the project. Why did you decide to go ahead with 
excavation work at that time? 
A. We were trying to beat the weather. I raised that question with 
Marshall. They said they felt confident enough about the project that 
they would front the money for excavation and other costs, and so 
they did.86 
In fact, the Bank had actual knowledge that work had commenced since it 
helped facilitate an unsecured loan to the Developer.87 Jim Krumm, the 
BankFirst senior vice president, testified in his deposition that he knew that the 
excavation work would proceed prior to the time the construction loan would be 
finalized. He testified as follows: 
Q. When we were discussing this need that Myler had for financing in the 
September of 2004 time frame, did Myler indicate to you that he wanted to 
get things moving on the project? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But he lacked money to get it moving? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he indicate as part of that that he wanted to get some excavation 
work going to get the project moving? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After he got the loan, did he indicate to you that in fact he was going to 
proceed with that excavation work? 
Bb
 Larry Myler Depo., 26:22-27 to 27:17; 29:1-7; 150:15-24 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "4"]. 
87
 Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23-25; 37:1-18; 99:3-11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"] 
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A. I don't recall that conversation. 
Q. Do you recall the conversation that he wanted to get it to get 
excavation going? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you understand during this time frame that we've been talking about 
that Larry had proceeded with doing excavation work on the site? 
A. After he received the loan? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was in the middle of September, roughly, of '04? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you saw the excavation? 
A. When I drove up, yes. 
Q. It was pretty evident to you that the excavation had occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That didn't surprise you because you were aware that Larry [Myler] 
was going to start with the excavation work. 
A. No, it did not surprise me.88 
Indeed, everyone who was questioned about the Project site prior to the 
loan closing testified they saw the gigantic excavated pit. The Bank has provided 
no evidence that the excavation was not visible to one making a site inspection. 
88
 Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23-25 to 37:18; 65:1-9; 99:3-11[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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Jim Krumm, senior vice president of BankFirst, also testified in his deposition that 
he saw the enormous hole when he visited the Project site in March or April of 
2005 to meet a representative of a potential participant bank on the Project.89 
Mr. Krumm testified as follows: 
Q. Back to the hole that you saw when you drove in, obviously 
readily observable to anybody that walked on the site. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you give me any more what you believe the dimensions 
might be of the hole? 
A. It was big. I have no idea how to tell you how deep and wide it 
was. I didn't - I wasn't that - I wasn't there to determine how big the 
hole was. It was just a big hole in the ground. It was deep and it 
was long and it was, you know. 
Q. And your testimony is you don't have an understanding of why 
that hole would have been dug in that location or to that depth. 
A. They were eventually going to put a building in there, you know. 
Q. And was the building that they were going to put in there one of 
the buildings that you guys were marketing in the pictures in the -
you've seen the renderings of the project? 
A. Yes. 
89
 Jim Krumm Depo., 95:2 to 99:11; 107:10 to 110:8 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; The 
Bank misstates the law when it argues that actual notice of work does not trigger 
the relation back rule. The cases cited by the Bank relate to actual notice of 
offsite lienable design work. Under Utah law, offsite lienable design work does 
not constitute first work even if the lender has actual notice of such work or if 
there is record notice of such work. Offsite design work does not constitute 
visible work on site; See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R.7850] attached hereto as 
Second Addendum to the Brief. 
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Q. - one of the buildings that was going to go in there, one of the 
wings of the main building? 
Given the size of the excavation abutting State Street in Orem, it was 
obviously visible to anyone who visited the site that construction was underway. 
It was "gigantic" and the two holes existed "conspicuously so."91 The 
representative of title company working on the loan closing, Adella Pearson of 
Equity Title Company, inspected the property, and testified in her deposition that 
she observed the hole... ,92 After inspecting the property and being aware of the 
fact that excavation had already begun, Ms. Pearson completed and transmitted 
the Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form advising the title company that in fact 
"excavation had begun."93 Pearson further testified that from an underwriting 
perspective, she was concerned that work had taken place.94 The title 
company's Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis reads: 
U 32 - If work of improvement has commenced describe work being 
done. [Answer] - The tower is complete and excavation has begun. 
U 37 - Have all potential lien claimants been paid in full. [Answer] -
No. If not, how much remaining to be paid? [Answer] - This will be 
paid at close and release (same time). 
90
 Id, 107:10 to 110:8 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
91
 Larry Myler Depo., 31:17-23; 32:6-12 (hole is 12 foot deep); 43:9-18; 61:6-25; 
114:5-13; 202:14-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Deposition Exhibit 96; Brett Harris 
Depo., 115 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "2"]. 
92
 Adella Pearson Depo., 50:21-25; 58:25 to 59:9; 61:5-20 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
93
 Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
94
 Adella Pearson Depo., 58:25 to 61:21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
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fl 38 - Are there any recorded mechanics' liens? [Answer] 
Yes...$150,515.20 (same time).95 
None of the case law from Utah or any other jurisdiction cited by the Bank 
holds that an excavation of such an enormous size, for the purpose of a footing 
and an underground parking structure, does not qualify as notice to a person 
using reasonable diligence. How a massive excavated site measuring 
approximately 22 feet deep, 400 feet long and 170 feet wide would not be visible 
to an individual using reasonable diligence is a question left unanswered by the 
Bank. When coupled with the law that mechanics lien statutes should be 
construed liberally and in favor of the lien claimants, it is irrefutable that the 
excavation and shoring work done in fall 2004 and early 2005 qualifies as 
"commencement of work." 
B. The Bank Was Actually Aware of the Excavation Work Prior to 
Recording the Bank Deed of Trust. 
As previously outlined, the Bank had actual knowledge that work had 
commenced since it helped facilitate an unsecured loan to the Developer.96 
Krumm of BankFirst knew that the excavation work would proceed prior to the 
time the construction loan would be finalized and testified to the same in his 
deposition.97 
95
 Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
96
 Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23-25; 37:1-18; 99: 3-11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
97
 Jim Krumm Depo., 36:23 to 37:18; 65:1-9; 99:3-11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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Jim Krumm, who originated the loan and was the senior vice president of 
BankFirst, also had discussions with management of the Bank (BankFirst) and 
perhaps his own legal department about the fact that excavation had started and 
was concerned with broken priority.98 Krumm and the Bank were concerned 
about the potential of liens from those that performed the excavation work and 
wanted to be sure that they were protected from liens from those that did the 
excavation work by title insurance." 
In furtherance of its commitment to protect the Bank's first lien security 
interest, the Title Company obtained a lien release from Wadsworth at the time 
that the loan closed. Clearly, the Title Company and the Bank were aware that 
those entities that had performed work prior to the loan closing.100 They made 
sure that the contractors were paid from the first draws of the June, 2005, 
including Reynolds Bros., Wadsworth and the General Contractor.101 This was 
confirmed in the answers to questions in the Bank documents which stated in 
response to question #10 that "the title company has agreed to protect the 
Bank's first lien security interest from any other liens arising from the preliminary 
site work."102 
98
 Id, 93:17 to 95:9; 107:10-25; 108:1-25 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Deposition Exhibit 165, U 32, 37, 38; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "5"]. 
101
 Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Deposition Exhibit 190. 
102
 Id., 54 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; Deposition Exhibit 189. 
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Another document that provided compelling evidence about whether or 
not work had commenced on the Project was the First American Title Company's 
Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form prepared by Equity Title Company. In the 
form Question #32 asks: "If work of improvement had commenced describe the 
work being done." The response written in by Adella Pearson of Equity Title 
Company was "The Tower' is complete and excavation has begun."103 Pearson 
acknowledged the massive hole was to the west of the Icon Tower which was the 
location of the south tower.104 Equity Title, the title company handling the 
closing, and First American, the insurance company that issued the title policy, 
had concerns about the fact construction had commenced as further testified to 
by Pearson.105 Equity Title acknowledged in its report to First American that 
excavation construction work had taken place and was the subject of unpaid 
mechanic's liens that needed to be paid at closing.106 
The conclusion that visible construction work which commenced on the 
Project prior to the recording of the Bank's trust deed as required by Utah Code § 
38-1-5 should be affirmed. 
Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
Adella Pearson Depo., 37:25 to 38:1-9; 50:20-25 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
Adella Pearson Depo., 58:25 to 61:21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
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VI. PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE § 38-1-5 MECHANIC'S LIENS RELATE 
BACK TO AND TAKE EFFECT AS OF THE COMMENCEMENT TO DO 
WORK. 
In its Order, the District Court held that the excavation for the underground 
parking and the mat footings in September 2004 and early 2005 constituted the 
commencement of work on the Project pursuant to Utah Code § 38-1-5, and that 
all valid mechanic's liens related back to the commencement of the work in 
September 2004 and have priority over any encumbrance which attached 
subsequent to September 2004.107 
The District Court based this conclusion on its legal conclusions that (1) in 
accordance with Utah Code § 38-1-5 and E.W. Allen Associates, Inc. v. FDIC, 
776 F. Supp. 1504 (1991), to determine the priority date of a mechanics' lien 
against another encumbrance, the Court must look to the commencement of 
work on the structure or improvements; (2) the substantial excavation work done 
in September 2004 through early 2005 was not mere site preparation work; 
rather it was clearly the commencement of a large construction project; (3) the 
substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 
constitutes constructive notice that work had commenced on the Main Building of 
the Project and that construction was underway; and (4) the substantial 
excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 also constituted 
107
 See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R. 7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief. 
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actual notice to both the Bank and the title company that work had commenced 
on the Main Building of the Project and that construction was underway.108 
A. Mechanics' Liens Relate Back to Commencement of 
Construction for the Purpose of Determining Priority. 
In determining priority between the liens of the Claimants and the trust 
deeds of the Bank, there is a specifically created statutory preference for 
mechanics' lienholders in that mechanic's liens relate back to, and take effect as 
of the time of the commencement to do work on the buildings, structures or 
improvements constituting the Project. Utah Code § 38-1-5 provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as 
of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on 
the ground for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority 
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have 
attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement 
or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground... . 
This statutory preference for mechanics' lienholders has been upheld by 
Utah courts. For example, the court in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. 
Zundel and Assoc, held that: 
Materialmen's and mechanics' liens resulting from materials 
furnished or labor performed relate back to and attach as of the date 
108
 See Corrected Order, at p. 8-9 [R. 7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief. 
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of the commencement of the first work on the improvement or 
structure involved.109 
In the present matter, this Court should affirm the specifically created 
statutory preference followed by the District Court, providing that the Claimant's 
liens relate back to, and take effect as of, time of commencement to do work or 
furnish materials for the building, improvement, or structure. 
B. Mechanic's Liens Have Priority Over Trust Deed Recorded After 
the Commencement of Construction. 
Mechanics liens have priority over any mortgage or trust deed recorded 
subsequent in time to the commencement of visible construction work. It is 
undisputed that visible construction work commenced on the Project in 
September 2004 through early 2005 with the beginning of the excavation and 
gunite and soil nailing work relating to the underground parking on the Project. 
As a result, the numerous mechanics' liens filed in 2008 by the Claimants relate 
back in time and take effect as of September 2004. While the Bank has tried to 
argue that this was a collection of separate projects this argument is a legal 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel and Assoc, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1979); CalderBros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) (purpose of 
mechanics' lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to 
laborers and materialmen who have added directly to value of property of 
another by their materials or labor); Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. 
Heritage Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217, cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1989) (the phrase "commencement to do work," within the meaning of 
statute providing that liens relate back to, and take effect as of, time of 
commencement to do work or furnish materials and have priority over any lien 
subsequent to time when building, improvement, or structure was commenced, is 
construed in favor of lien claimant). 
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argument not a factual one. There is no witness testimony or a document that 
supports that position. As a result, the Claimants' mechanics' liens have priority 
over the subsequent trust deeds recorded by the Bank against the property in 
June 2005 and thereafter. 
In determining the priority between the mechanics' liens of the Claimants 
and the trust deeds of the Bank, this Court should affirm the statutory preference 
followed by the District Court in favor of the Claimants and determine that the 
Claimants' liens relate back to, and take effect when work commenced which 
was before June 2005. This Court should also affirm the District Court's ruling 
that the Claimants have priority over all Bank trust deeds subsequent in time as a 
matter of law. 
The determination that the Claimants' mechanic's liens related back to, 
and took effect as of the commencement to do work in September 2004 as 
required by Utah Code § 38-1-5 should be affirmed. 
VII. THERE WAS NO MATERIAL ABANDONMENT OF THE PROJECT. 
A. The District Court was Correct in Determining that the 
Undisputed Facts Showed that There was No Material 
Abandonment of the Project. 
In its Order, the District Court held that at no time was the Project 
materially abandoned by the Bank, the Developer, the Architect, Orem City, or 
the Claimants but was a single project constructed under a common plan and 
*1 
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prosecuted with reasonable promptness in accordance with Utah 
jurisprudence.110 
The District Court based its conclusion on the undisputed facts that: 
(1) Mr. Larry Myler was the developer of the Project and was the 
principal contact person for each of the entities that developed 
the Project including Western Oasis, Tower Development 
Services, Midtown LLC and Midtown Village Joint Venture; 
(2) Midtown Village Joint Venture was the successor of the 
interests of Western Oasis, Tower Development Services, and 
Midtown LLC, in the development of the Project; 
(3) Marshall/BankFirst was the lender that worked with Mr. Myler 
from July 2004 until BankFirst funded the $42 million loan in 
June 2005; 
(4) Marshall provided the developer with a loan commitment letter 
for the Project in August 2004, required from the developer a 
$15,000 good faith deposit for the Project loan in August 2004, 
helped arrange and fund a $562,000 loan to permit the 
Developer to commence excavating the Project in September 
2004, developed and created its [Bank's] marketing package in 
September 2004 and began acquiring subscriptions from 
participant banks in October 2004, persisted in its [Bank's] 
efforts to finance the Project until it succeeded in having the 
loan closed in June 2005, acquired subscriptions from 
participant banks in October and November 2004, and 
approved a stronger guarantor for the Developer to improve the 
marketing package in December of 2004, maintained existing 
participant banks and acquired subscriptions from additional 
participant banks in 2005; 
(5) At all material times the architect was Ken Harris Architect; 
110
 See Corrected Order, at p. 9-10 [R. 7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief. 
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(6) At all material times the Project was a mixed use project with 
residential condos, offices, and retail spaces in a main building 
situated in a "U" shape consisting of South, North and West 
wings with a central courtyard surrounded by an Icon Tower. 
The Project was designed to have underground parking with 
approximately 98,000 square feet of retail on the first floors, 
106,000 square feet of office space on the second floors, and 
243 residential condominiums on the third through seventh 
floors. More than 50% of the 243 residential condos had been 
pre-sold and more than 50% of the retail space had been 
preleased, before and while, BankFirst was marketing the 
financing package to participant banks; 
(7) At all material times there was a common plan on the Project -
the Project remained a mixed use project with essentially the 
same make up in the uses; 
(8) BankFirst and its bank representative to the Project were 
actively engaged in efforts to finance this Project, and about five 
months after the work on the excavation stopped, the loan was 
committed and closed; 
(9) From the loan closing on June 15, 2005, $650,000 from the 
loan proceeds was used to pay for the excavation work 
performed in September 2004 and early 2005 and $150,000 
from the loan proceeds was used to pay for the gunite and soil 
nailing shoring work; 
(10) At the request of BankFirst for an additional guarantor, Larry 
Myler made efforts to bring Mr. Jerry Moyes in as an additional 
guarantor on the construction loan for the Project. Those efforts 
succeeded and Mr. Moyes became an additional guarantor on 
the loan to BankFist in order for Midtown Village JV to obtain 
the loan from BankFirst; 
(11) There were ongoing efforts by BankFirst to market and close 
the loan during the fall of 2004 up through and until the loan 
closed in June of 2005; 
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(12) Mr. Myler and his various entities remained involved on the 
Project after Mr. Moyes got involved as a guarantor for the loan; 
and 
(13) Ellsworth Paulsen Construction remained involved with the 
Project even though it worked with two other contractors during 
the course of the Project: Bud Bailey Construction was a co-
general contractor before the loan closed, and Big-D was the 
co-general contractor after the loan closed.111 
By its Order, the District Court also held that: 
(1) The Bank did not materially abandon the Project; 
(2) Larry Myler and his entities did not materially abandon the 
Project; 
(3) The Project was a single project constructed under a common 
plan; 
(4) Any design changes that occurred were never such that the 
changes would signal that the Project that had been 
conceptualized was abandoned and a new different project was 
being commenced; 
(5) The same project that was commenced with excavation for the 
mat footings and the underground parking was prosecuted, 
under the circumstances of the Project, with reasonable 
promptness without material abandonment; 
(6) Any delay in the Project resulting from financial problems did 
not constituted an abandonment of the Project given the 
continued efforts by those involved including the Bank to 
resolve those financial problems and the success of those 
efforts within approximately five months resulted in the 
construction loan sold to participant banks, funded and closed; 
111
 See Corrected Order, at p. 5-9 [R. 7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief. 
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(7) No cessation of work on the Project occurred that would be 
sufficient to put a reasonable observer on notice that the Project 
had been abandoned; 
(8) The Project did not stop and another project was not initiated; 
and 
(9) The Project was not materially abandoned from the time the 
excavation work commenced in the fall of 2004 to the time the 
loan closed in June 2005.112 
Accordingly, each of the undisputed facts and conclusions are correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Utah law is clear on what constitutes material abandonment of a 
construction project. Utah follows the majority rule on this legal principal. "For a 
contractor's lien to relate back to the commencement of work or the supplying of 
materials by another contractor however, both contractors' projects must have 
been performed in connection with what is essentially a single project performed 
under a common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment."113 
"[A] construction project has been materially abandoned when a 
reasonable observer of the site would be on notice that the persons who 
performed work apparently did not intend to continue to completion.114 However, 
112
 See Corrected Order, at p. 9-10 [R. 7850] attached hereto as Second 
Addendum to the Brief. 
113
 CalderBros. Construction v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). 
114
 Nu-Trend Electric v. Desert Federal S&L, 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah App. 
1990). 
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temporary cessation of work through a loss of funding does not necessarily mean 
a project is materially abandoned.115 
A temporary halt to construction activity is not a "material abandonment." 
The Ketchum Konkel court cited a Minnesota Supreme Court decision that is 
somewhat analogous to the case at bar. The Minnesota court held that the 
excavation of a basement for a building was the commencement of work on the 
project and that it was one continuous project even though the excavation took 
place prior to the purchase of the land or the contracts to build vertically were 
signed, two months before any other additional work took place. The Minnesota 
court ruled that "many things might cause a building project to be temporarily 
halted, but if there is no abandonment or severance of the contract it may still be 
entire and continuous in nature within the contemplation of the statute."116 
115
 Ketchum Konkel, Barret, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 
P.2d 1217, 1226 (Utah App. 1989); While the Claimants conceded that ordinarily 
material abandonment is a fact issue, it is not a fact issue in this case since none 
of the witnesses testified that the Project was materially abandoned but rather 
that the Project was not abandoned. Under the present case there is no fact 
issue. Just as negligence can be found as a matter of law if all of the witnesses 
say the defendant ran a red light, so can a conclusion that there was no material 
abandonment if those related to the project state under oath that they never left 
off of pushing the project forward from 2004 to when the loan was closed in June 
of 2005. As will be shown herein, the project was not materially abandoned from 
the time it was commenced in the late summer of 2004, to the date the work was 
suspended due to non-payment. What follows hereafter is not the bald 
conclusory arguments of counsel, but the unrebutted testimony of witnesses who 
were the participants in the development. 
116
 Id. 
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The Ketchum Konkel court also cited a Maryland decision that held that a 
15 month cessation of the construction of a nursing home because of difficulties 
in obtaining a state approval, bank financing and completion bonds did not 
constitute material abandonment of the project. "The issue more correctly stated 
is whether there had been sufficient cessation of work to constitute the end of 
construction on one project and the initiation of work on another." The Maryland 
court found that, although there was a significant cessation of work, it was due to 
reasons not unheard of in construction—loss of financing, failure to get a bond, 
and state approval—and that there was no evidence of an intention to give up the 
project. An additional reason the court found no material abandonment was that 
the project proceeded with little change in the original plans.117 "What is critical is 
that all of the work was done pursuant to a single project contemplated by the 
owners."118 
B. The Bank Failed to Provide Facts Showing the Project Was 
Materially Abandoned. 
The Bank's Brief on this issue claims the District Court impermissibly 
weighed evidence. However, there were absolutely no material facts in dispute. 
None. Literally every witness examined and every document produced supports 
the fact that the Project was continuous and ongoing. The Bank's material 
abandonment argument is not supported by the testimony of the witnesses or the 
^ i d . 
118
 Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah 1985). 
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documents. There was no genuine issue of fact that would support the position 
that the Project was materially abandoned. 
Despite this fact, the Bank has asserted that the Project was abandoned 
and the priority date for first visible construction work occurred after it filed its 
deed of trust in June 2005. In support of its argument the Bank claims there 
were changes in the owners, general contractor, scope of work, design, and 
alleged disconnection or lack of continuity between the site excavation for the 
Main Building and the vertical construction of the Main Building. In presenting 
this argument the Bank has selectively put forth limited facts which are not 
material or pre-date the commencement of construction. The Bank also has 
selectively picked excerpts of deposition testimony while leaving out portions of 
testimony that more fully explain the correct context in which that testimony was 
given. In many cases, the testimony the Bank had taken out of context 
contradicts the Bank's position on the abandonment issue. The District Court 
was not misled by this attempt because simply put the undisputed facts show 
otherwise. 
The Bank has not cited any deposition testimony wherein a witness 
testified that they believed or concluded that the Project was abandoned. The 
closest thing that the Bank has as evidence that the Project was abandoned is 
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their response to a request for admission signed, not by a representative of the 
Bank, but by counsel for the Bank. 
Counsel for the Bank responded to Request for Admission No. 2 stating 
that: 
Defendants informed Larry Myler and Dan Christensen in or about 
late 2004 or early 2005 that they did not qualify for financing for the 
'Midtown Project' as a result of Dan Christensen's poor credit 
history. At that point in time Defendants abandoned efforts to 
provide financing for the'Midtown Project.119 
However, the senior vice-president and lead of the Bank Krumm disputed 
the conclusion of counsel for BankFirst that BankFirst abandoned efforts to 
provide financing for the Midtown Project when he testified that BankFirst kept 
working on the financing even though there were hurdles to overcome. The 
pertinent portion of Mr. Krumm's deposition testimony was as follows: 
Q. Okay. Then the next sentence says, "At that point in time 
defendants abandoned efforts to obtain financing for the Midtown 
project." Based on our discussion today, I believe you disagree with 
that statement that the defendants abandoned their efforts to obtain 
financing in October 2004? 
A. Abandoned is kind of a word but no - I guess the answer is -
what was the question again? 
Q. The sentence says, "At that point in time," and I think we've 
isolated that down to the end of October 2004, "at that point in time 
defendants abandoned efforts to provide financing for the Midtown 
project." You disagree with that statement that Marshall Investments 
and BankFirst abandoned their efforts to obtain financing at the end 
of October 2004. 
Deposition Exhibit 194; Jim Krumm Depo., 136 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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A. Yes. Because we continued to try and finance it. (Emphasis 
added.)120 
As stated above: "What is critical is that all of the work was done pursuant 
to a single project contemplated by the owners."121 The present case before this 
Court constitutes a continuous project that did not change in purpose and intent; 
neither by the Developer, the Bank and those who provided the design and 
construction work. This Project didn't start as a mixed use project and turn into a 
golf course. The only thing the Project had was a temporary cessation of work 
through a loss of funding. When the parties overcame that funding hurdle the 
Project continued using the same participants and the same plans at the same 
location. 
C. A Change in Project Participants is Not a Material 
Abandonment. 
The undisputed fact is that after the first monies were procured for the 
Project from an affiliate of the Bank (BankFirst) in 2004, the Bank continued 
seeking and obtaining participant banks for the project.122 While the Bank was 
soliciting participant banks, the Developer was seeking a guarantor of sufficient 
strength for the overall Project financing and additional capacity from its general 
contractor, by another construction partner whose financial statement would be 
120
 Jim Krumm Depo., 137:5-16; 138:5-14 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
121
 Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734, 736 (Utah 1985). 
122
 Deposition Exhibits 184,186,187,188; Jim Krumm Depo., 43, 48, 51, 54 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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sufficient in the eyes of BankFirst.123 Once these hurdles in the development of 
the Project were overcome by the Developer and the Bank, the construction loan 
was closed and the Project continued. 
D. The Bank's Principal Witness Agrees the Project Was Not 
Materially Abandoned. 
The Bank never materially abandoned the Project. The position 
maintained by the Bank lacks any factual support or credibility. Vice President, 
Jim Krumm, was the Bank's principal contact with the developer and testified that 
after the subject excavation work was performed the: 
(1) BankFirst was continuing to tell participant banks that had 
already subscribed that they were working on getting the deal 
done;124 
(2) BankFirst was continuing to market the project to potential 
participant banks;125 
(3) BankFirst was working with the Developer to overcome 
concerns or objections raised by some potential participant 
banks;126 
(4) BankFirst was drafting and issuing a new marketing brochure 
with updated information making the deal a stronger more 
acceptable deal;127 
123
 Larry MylerDepo, 92:11 to 93:12; 129:4-15; 148:3 to 149:7 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"4"]. 
124
 Jim Krumm Depo., 56: 24 to 57:5; 70:14 to 71:6; 86:11-15 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"3"]. 
125
 Deposition Exhibits 155,184,186; Larry MylerDepo., 35 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 43, 48; 86:5-10 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
126
 Jim Krumm Depo., 44:24 to 45:5; 46:3-21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
127
 Deposition Exhibit 155; Larry MylerDepo., 35 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim 
Krumm Depo., 77:11-22; 78:6 to 79:10; 86:5-15 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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(5) BankFirst was using its best efforts to get the financing 
package completed;128 
(6) BankFirst was trying to close the loan so BankFirst could earn 
. a $900,000 fee upon closing;129 
(7) BankFirst knew that more than 50% of the condominiums had 
been sold and that more than 50% of the retail space had 
been pre-leased.130 
As previously cited, Mr. Jim Krumm, the senior vice-president and lead of 
the Bank for this Project, disputed the conclusion of counsel for the Bank, that 
the Bank abandoned efforts to provide financing for the Midtown Project. Mr. 
Krumm testified that the Bank kept working on the financing even though there 
were hurdles to overcome. At one point there were objections raised by some 
potential participant banks about the lack of strength by one of the guarantors. 
The Bank and the Developer worked continuously to solve those objections and 
found another acceptable guarantor in the form of Jerry Moyes. A number of 
banks signed up based upon the 1st loan package subscription. The Bank kept 
those subscribers on board and kept marketing through the "suspension" period, 
based upon the first package even while working on drafting second marketing 
package. After the second stronger package was issued, the Bank obtained 
additional participant banks (in addition to the previously obtained participant 
128
 Jim Krumm Depo., 34:21 to 35:11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
129
 Jim Krumm Depo., 89:7-12 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
130
 Deposition Exhibit 181, P. 1; Jim Krumm Depo., 27 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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banks) sufficient to do the deal. All this work in completing the loan funding 
occurred during the period the defendants claim the project was in a state of 
abandonment.132 
From the time the term sheet was given by the Bank to the Developer in 
July 2004 until the loan closed in June 2005 there was no change in the lender. 
The Bank had a working knowledge of the history of the Project that it was trying 
diligently to fund. The Bank cannot claim that the Project was abandoned and it 
was prejudiced when the undisputed facts show otherwise.133 
E. There was No Material Abandonment of the Common Purpose 
for the Project by the Owner. 
The Bank argues that the Project was abandoned after the excavation of 
the pit ceased in January 2005 and before work recommenced in October 2005, 
when excavation for spot footings began.134 
The critical undisputed facts from the mouths of the deposition witnesses 
(as opposed to arguments of the Bank) are that the Developer, the owner of the 
1d1
 Deposition Exhibit 187; Jim Krumm Depo., 51; 138:23 to 140:14 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "3"]. 
132
 Jim Krumm Depo., 54 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]; See Deposition Exhibit 188 
attached to the Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment which is a collection of some of the e-mails of BankFirst 
representatives about their efforts from October 2004 to June 2005 to get the 
financing package completed [R.5337-5507]. 
133
 Deposition Exhibit 153,181, 182, 184-187, Larry MylerDepo., 26:22 to 
27:17[R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 27; 39:10-23; 32, 36:23 to 37:18; 
43, 45, 48, 51, 54 ; 65:1-9 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
134
 See a Project Timeline attached hereto as Sixth Addendum to the Brief. 
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Project from the beginning, never abandoned the Project. The Bank cites out of 
context and against extensive testimony to the contrary an alleged expression by 
the Developer that "the project was dead." That is not what the Developer 
testified. The actual testimony from the Developer states his efforts were to 
prosecute the Project to completion.135 The Developer testified that he worked 
persistently and consistently from the time of the grounding breaking in 
September 2004 to the middle of June 2005 to: (1) get the financing completed; 
(2) get Orem City bonds issued; (3) keep buyers that had purchased units still on 
board with the project; and (4) keep the designers and contractors fully engaged 
on the design and construction issues.136 In fact, the Developer stated further 
that: 
Q. But at the same context, was that any reason for you to 
consider abandoning the project, giving up on the project, or was it 
just something you dealt with and moved forward to get an additional 
contractor to help with Ellsworth-Paulsen? 
A. I did not abandon the project. I went on a hunt for a new 
company to join and we found them.137 
Likewise, Jim Krumm, the senior vice-president of BankFirst, himself 
testified that the Developer never abandoned his efforts to get the Project 
Larry MylerDepo., 92:11-21; 93:4-12 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
Larry MylerDepo., 92:11-21; 93:4-12; 118:4 to 119:24 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
Larry MylerDepo., 93:4-12 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
64 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
developed.138 In fact, the real estate agents working for the Developer did not 
abandon the Project but kept in contact with those who had purchased 50% of 
the Project units throughout the winter and summer of 2005, by, among other 
methods, sending out newsletters updating them on the status of the Project.139 
The Bank states in its Brief that Tower Development was to be the 
developer of the Project. That statement is not accurate. The Bank confirmed in 
its term sheet letter of July 28, 2004, addressed to the Developer, that the 
borrower would be a newly formed limited liability company, a single asset 
company.140 That is in fact what happened. The Developer first formed Midtown 
Village LLC and then, after the new guarantor Jerry Moyes was added to the 
developer team, they formed Midtown Joint Venture LLC.141 The Bank was fully 
aware at all times of the Developer entities as it acknowledges in its July and 
August 2004 commitment letters that a new LLC would be formed.142 There is no 
basis for the Bank to argue that the different Developer entities permits the Bank 
to now deem the Project "materially abandoned" when the Bank never 
considered the Project abandoned during the course of the Project. 
138
 Jim Krumm Depo., 45:13 to 48:5; 113:10 to 114:15; 138: 5-14 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "3"]. 
139
 Deposition Exhibits 96,154,158; Brett Harris Depo., 115 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"2"]; Larry Myler Depo., 31, 42, 123:25 to 124:23 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
140
 Deposition Exhibit 180; Jim Krumm Depo., 23 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
141
 Larry Myler Depo., 116; 25 to 118:3 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
142
 Deposition Exhibits 180,181; Jim Krumm Depo., 23, 27 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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The Bank argues in its Brief that the fact that Western Oasis, Tower 
Development, and Midtown Village are different entities somehow creates a fact 
issue regarding abandonment. Quite apart from the fact that all of the entities 
referred to were the Developer owned and managed,143 numerous cases have 
held that changes in owners or successive owners do not negate the relation 
back doctrine, nor are multiple owners evidence of abandonment.144 Under Utah 
law, the question is whether the project is essentially a single project with a 
common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness.145 In all of its dealing on 
the Project, the Bank dealt with the Developer as the authorized representative of 
the owner and developer.146 That never changed. 
The Bank also refers to documents from a third party to this litigation, 
Orem City, who was heavily involved in the deal. Those documents clearly 
corroborate the common nature of the developer for the Project. Orem City and 
Mr. Myler used his existing land holding entity Western Oasis when he 
purchased the ground. As construction started, he transferred the property into 
another of his entities - Tower Development Services. As he brought in other 
investors he created single asset limited liability companies to proceed with the 
project. Throughout all of the development, Myler was the manager for the 
entities that were developing the project. Larry Myler Depo., 152:15 to 154:12; 
136:2-6 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
144
 First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. CN Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 
(Utah1979)(Subdivision with successive owners and separate original 
contractors did not effect the priority of the liens to the trust deed); Vasquez v. 
Village Center, Inc., 362 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1962)(Developer that did not come 
into existence until after work of mechanic's was in place did not effect the 
relation back effect of the excavation). 
145
 Calder Bros., 652 P.2d, supra at 924. 
146
 Jim Krumm Depo., 30:5-12 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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the Developer entities entered into a series of Development Agreements 
commencing in 2002 continuing after the loan was closed. The Development 
Agreement dated July 19, 2005147, about a month after the loan closed, is 
between Orem City "and the following entities: 
Western Oasis Properties, LC, a Utah Limited Liability Company with 
its principal offices at 320 South State Street, Orem, Utah 84058; 
Tower Development Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation with its 
principal offices at 320 South State Street, Orem, Utah 84058; 
Midtown Village LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company with its 
principal offices at 320 South State Street, Orem, Utah 84058. 
The Developer (Larry Myler) signed the Development Agreement on behalf 
of each of the entities all of which were located at the project address. A later 
Development Agreement entered into on Feb. 21, 2006148 included all of the 
foregoing Developer entities but added another Developer entity: 
Midtown Joint Venture, L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company with its 
principal offices at 320 South State Street, Orem, Utah 84058. 
Once again, the Developer (Larry Myler) signed the new Development 
Agreement on behalf of all four of the Developer entities all of which again were 
located at the project address. 
147
 See Exhibit "B" to the Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment [R.5337-5507]. 
148
 See Exhibit "C" to the Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment [R.5337-5507]. 
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What can be seen from the undisputed facts is that while there is some 
fluidity about ownership entities at different points during the lending and 
construction process, the Developer is the common owner and manager who 
unyieldingly pressed the Project forward. The Developer and the essential single 
nature of the project are the continuity of a single project performed with a 
common plan. 
F. There was No Material Abandonment on the Part of the 
Contractors and Designers. 
The Bank misconstrues the undisputed facts when it claims that the owner 
was "hiring one general contractor after another." The owner hired Ellsworth 
Paulsen to construct the Icon Building.149 The owner then hired Ellsworth 
Paulsen to construct the Main Building with its three wings.150 The Bank 
marketed the Project in its first package with Ellsworth Paulsen as the general 
contractor. According to the Developer, some potential participant banks of the 
Bank had a concern about the strength of Ellsworth Paulsen.151 At the request of 
the Bank, the Developer and Ellsworth Paulsen found another contractor to team 
up with Ellsworth Paulsen and participate in the Project - that was Bud Bailey 
Construction.152 The Bank represented in its second marketing package that 
Ellsworth Paulsen was the general contractor to construct the Main Building with 
149
 Deposition Exhibit 4; Allen Washburn Depo., 48 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
150
 Deposition Exhibit 18; Allen Washburn Depo., 91 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
151
 Larry Myler Depo., 89:25 to 90:19 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
152
 Larry Myler Depo., 90:20-24 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
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its three wings and that Bud Bailey Construction would serve as the supervisory 
contractor and provide a guarantee.153 Between the time of the ground breaking 
in September 2004, to the time of the closing of the loan in 2005, Ellsworth 
Paulsen remained as the general contractor and Bud Bailey Construction was 
added as a supervisory contractor to the team. To accomplish that goal, they 
formed a joint venture and entered into a contract with the owner dated April 25, 
2005.154 
Again the material facts are not in dispute. But contrary to the portrayal of 
the Bank this is hardly the owner "hiring one contractor after another." It is clear 
that the addition of Bud Bailey Construction as a joint venture partner with 
Ellsworth Paulsen was done to satisfy the Bank's requirements and concerns.155 
Simply put, this clearly reflects that the Project was going forward, not that it was 
materially abandoned. 
Virtually every case that has considered the issue has held that multiple 
original contractors has no effect on the priority of the liens nor is it an indicia of 
abandonment. For example, Calder Bros, holds that as long as there is 
continuity in the project, the claims of multiple prime contractors will relate 
153
 Deposition Exhibit 155 p. 12; Larry Myler Depo., 35 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
154
 Deposition Exhibit 19; Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
155
 After the loan closed, Bud Bailey did not want to participate further in the 
Project. Big-D Construction was obtained by the Developer as an alternative to 
Bud Bailey. Big-D was accepted by BankFirst as the new joint venture partner of 
Ellsworth that would proceed with the construction. See Allen Washburn Depo., 
96 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
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back.156 Similarly, in Duckett v. Olsen the Court expressly held that the presence 
of multiple prime contractors does not affect priority as long as it is intended for a 
single project.157 
The Bank argues that it is critical that the excavation and shoring work for 
the Main Building was performed by two contractors (Reynolds and Wadsworth) 
and the structure of the Main Building constructed by another contractor (EP/Big-
D JV). The Bank would have the Court ignore the relation back principal 
established by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5; i.e.; that all lien claims relate back to 
one common date - the date when construction was first commenced upon the 
ground. All contractors who performed work on the Project are, under Utah law, 
on an equal footing when it comes to determining priority between the 
contractors and any lending institution.158 
Ellsworth Paulsen filed a Notice of Commencement with the Utah County 
Recorder of its $59 million contract contemporaneously with the excavation work 
being done by Reynolds and Wadsworth.159 The excavation was all in the scope 
of Ellsworth Paulsen's contract with Tower Development. In fact, Ellsworth 
Paulsen provided construction management services during the time the 
excavation and shoring work was done. Ellsworth Paulsen was paid $150,000 at 
156
 Calder Bros., 652 P.2d, supra at 924. 
157
 Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P.2d 734 736 (Utah 1985). 
158
 See Utah Code §38-1-5. 
159
 Deposition Exhibit 14; Allen Washburn Depo., 77 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
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the time of the Bank loan closing which included the costs of that supervisory 
work.160 
The contract between Tower and Ellsworth Paulsen included the 
excavation work. The later contract between Tower and Ellsworth/Paulsen Bud 
Bailey Construction included the same excavation. The last contract between 
Midtown JV and EP/Big-D also included the excavation work for the Main 
Building and the overall construction of the Project.161 It is undisputed that the 
$800,000 worth of excavation and shoring work performed from September 2004 
to January 2005 was part of the construction of the Main Building. It is also 
undisputed that not all of the excavation work was completed in the fall and 
winter of 2004. The Bank in its haste to argue the excavation as a separate 
project, neglected the undisputed fact that excavation was always part of the 
scope of the construction work required the contracts to build the Main building. 
This excavation work was not completed in the fall/winter of 2004. In fact, after 
the final funding came through in June 2005, the remaining portions of the north 
tower and the central plant were excavated by Reynolds Brothers Excavation.162 
The excavation for the west tower was never completed. 
160
 Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., P.102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
161
 Deposition Exhibits 18, p. 37; Appendix "B" to Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [R.5337-5507]; Deposition Exhibits 19; 
21, 101 (Division 2, Lines 8-11, 19); Allen Washburn Depo., 91,94,100 [R.5507 
A, Exhibit "7"]. 
162
 Deposition Exhibit 73. 
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The Utah Mechanics Lien Statute at § 38-1-5 provides that all work on an 
improvement or building relates back to the first work on that building or 
improvement. In the case at bar, there is continuity in terms of the owners (all 
are Larry Myler entities), contractors (Ellsworth Paulsen was always there) and 
designer (always Ken Harris Architects) from the time that the site excavation for 
the main building and continuing with the later construction of the main building. 
G. The Scope and Nature of the Project Did Not Materially Change 
Between the Commencement of Excavation in September 2004 
and the Time of the Loan Closing in June 2005. 
The Bank also makes the unfounded argument that there were numerous 
changes which were made to the Project which somehow evidence a material 
abandonment of the Project or a change in its continuity or common purpose. 
Once again, the best evidence comes from the Bank documents. The Bank 
persistently described the project in the same fashion. The Project was 
described to be a mixed use project consisting of two buildings - the Icon Building 
and the Main Building which had three wings (or towers) over underground 
parking with retail space on the ground floors, office space on the second floors 
and 243 residential condominiums on the upper floors. The Bank did not change 
its descriptions of the Project throughout its marketing of the project to its 
participant banks. 
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The Bank and the Developer consistently marketed the Project as the 
same project during all pertinent times.163 The Project has always been 
described as a Main Building with three wings (or towers) over underground 
parking with retail space on the ground floors, office space on the second floors 
and 243 residential condominiums on the upper floors. The foot print of the Main 
Building did not change. In fact, over 50% of the condos had been pre-sold and 
over 50% of the retail space had been pre-leased before the time of the alleged 
"material abandonment." 
As further evidence of the fact that the Project was the same project is the 
fact that the plans incorporated into the Ellsworth Paulsen contract dated May 5, 
2004 were the same plans incorporated into the Ellsworth Paulsen/Bud Bailey 
1W
 The Bank refers on several occasions to the "change in the elimination of 
another tower." The Bank misleads the Court by stating that the tower was 
eliminated "between September 2004 and October 2005." The Bank knows full 
well that a fourth tower was never even considered to be a realistic part of the 
Project. The Developer testified in his deposition, in response to questioning by 
the Bank, that the fourth tower was never more than a hope and a dream that 
would only come into play if the initial Project was successful. Larry Myler Depo., 
78:8-21 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. The Developer did not own the land on which the 
fourth tower was even contemplated. The fourth tower was never part of the 
commitment letters from the Bank to the Developer. The fourth tower was never 
part of the loan marketing packages created by the Bank. The fourth tower was 
not part of the Ellsworth Paulsen contract, was not part of the Ellsworth 
Paulsen/Bud Bailey contract nor part of the Ellsworth Paulsen /Big-D contract. 
The fourth tower was not part of the design plans (except as shown as a potential 
phase 2 of the project). No one, from the Developer, the lender, the contractors 
or the designers considered a forth tower as other than a long term whim. 
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contract dated April 25, 2005.164 Furthermore, the same plans were incorporated 
into the Ellsworth Paulsen/Big-D contract that was entered into after the loan 
closing on August 23, 2005.165 
The Bank also claims there was a change in the square footage of the 
project by 125.000166 square feet. That is completely false. The foot print of the 
Project was never changed. The Project, at all relevant times, included 243 
condos. The Bank is incorrectly comparing the square footage with and without 
including the square footage of the decks. The size differential results from the 
Bank incorrectly including the square footage for the exterior decks.167 
The Bank also claims that the plans were not completed.168 This 
undisputed fact does not create a genuine issue. Like all projects, there were 
164
 Deposition Exhibit 19; Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
165
 Deposition Exhibit 21; Allen Washburn Depo., 94 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
166
 The Bank cited testimony from Allen Washburn who said he needed to review 
the documents to verify the quantities. See Allen Washburn Depo., 47:22 to 48:9 
[R.5507 A, Exhibit "7"]. 
167
 Deposition Exhibit 155; Larry Myler Depo., 35 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; 
Deposition Exhibits 180,181; Jim Krumm Depo., 23, 27[R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
168
 Another "red herring" is the alleged change to the chiller plant. The creation 
of the central plant was done long before the ground breaking in September 
2004. That change was on the drawings as of January 7, 2004. The basis of 
BankFirst's incorrect timing stems from its reliance on the timing of Reynolds' bid 
for the excavation of the central plant. That bid came later in the project. The 
excavation for the central plant, which Myler testified was not on the critical path, 
occurred later in time. See Larry Myler Depo., 133:10 to 134:14 [R.5507 A, 
Exhibit "4"]. The reduction in the size of the underground central plant by 2800 
sq. ft. occurred on as a value engineering suggestion by Ellsworth Paulsen/Bud 
Bailey during the relevant time frame. The 10% reduction in the size of the 
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some portions of the plans of the Project that had not yet been finalized. This 
was to be a fast-track project that would allow plans to be completed ahead of 
the construction process. No person has ever testified that the lack of details 
kept the project from moving forward or being constructed or that the lack of 
completion of the plans caused the Project to be materially abandoned. To the 
contrary, the un-rebutted testimony is that once construction resumed the 
designers kept working on details to support the continued construction.169 
Compelling evidence that the uncompleted plans were not a cause of 
material abandonment is found in the Bank's own inspector. In its first report to 
the Bank dated August 18, 2005, the report stated on page 21: "It is our opinion 
that generally the drawings and specifications received were satisfactory, subject 
to clarifications of items noted above." 
Further, during this entire time of alleged changes and material 
abandonment, the Bank was giving the same plans to interested potential 
participating banks to review as part of their efforts to get them to subscribe to 
the loan package.170 
Attached hereto as First Addendum to this Brief a copy of the architectural 
rendering of the Project and a photograph of the model created by the Developer 
structure housing the underground heating plant can in no way be construed as 
an indication of abandonment of the project. 
169
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, If 4 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
170
 Deposition Exhibit 188; Jim Krumm Depo., 54 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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of the Project. The Court will readily observe that the Project from beginning to 
the end is substantially the same with no variations of a material nature that 
would lead to the conclusion that the Project was materially abandoned. 
None of the changes claimed by the Bank are material facts in dispute. As 
stated above, the Bank is in no position to claim there were material changes to 
the Project when they described the Project the same way. To point out the 
errors in the Bank's statement of the facts in its brief relative to the changes the 
following information is included. Many of the changes pointed out by the Bank 
in its Brief were made either before or after the applicable time frame. Of the 
changes discussed by the Bank, the following changes occurred before the 
ground breaking in September 2004: 
(a) The changes that were made to the stairways and elevator 
accesses had been resolved long before the groundbreaking. They 
were all reflected in the drawings dated January 7, 2004;171 
(b) The number of stories in the building were resolved years 
before the groundbreaking. The number of stories had been 
determined back in 2002. The final number of stories was reflected 
in all of the BankFirst marketing materials. The number of stories 
were reflected in the drawings dated January 7, 2004. The number 
of floors were shown in the renderings of 2002. The number of floors 
were reflected in the model constructed by the Developer and used 
by the real estate agents in marketing the Project.172 
(c) The storm-water detention pond, was moved to the second 
level of South Tower parking structure a parking area and park 
eliminated from the site plan. These items were determined before 
Affidavit of Brett Harris, U 4 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
Affidavit of Brett Harris, flfl 5-8 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
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the Bank became involved. The drawings with these items removed 
were reflected in the drawings dated January 7, 2004.173 
Of the changes discussed by the Bank, the following changes occurred 
after the closing of the loan in June 2005: 
(a) The atriums were always part of the Project. There were 
ongoing discussions whether or not to put a roof over the atriums. 
The decision to put roofs over the atriums was made after the loan 
closed and work had resumed. Whether or not the atriums were 
open or had roofs over them is not a material change to the project. 
that would constitute "material abandonment" of the Project;174 
(b) A level of exterior parking on the West Tower was moved 
under the structure long after the loan closed. The parking garage 
details for the West Tower (the last tower planned to be constructed) 
had not yet been finalized before the loan closed. Those details 
were resolved long after the loan closed while the construction was 
underway in the south and north wings. Of course this was a design 
change only since the West Wing was never constructed;175 
(c) There were minor changes in the layout of the building. The 
layout changes were to move a small amount of space at the end of 
hallways into condos to increase the square footage of 16 of the 243 
condos. These changes were made after the loan closed;176 
(d) The type of roof shingles was upgraded long after the loan 
closed as the work got closer to needing to make a final decision on 
the type of shingles to be used. The same thing was done in 
upgrading the windows from vinyl to wood. That upgrade was made 
long after the loan closed and while work was proceeding. BankFirst 
cannot in good faith claim that such upgrades constitute a material 
abandonment of the Project;177 
173
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, H 4 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
174
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, U 9 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
175
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, HIT 10-13 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
176
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, ffl| 14-15 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
177
 Affidavit of Brett Harris, 1J1J16-17 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
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(e) The field changes to the roof design discussed by BankFirst 
were not really changes but more properly providing the necessary 
details needed in making connections between the various roofing 
members to maintain the roof line as designed. Such is common 
practice in construction. The design drawings do not provide all of 
the construction details needed to make all such connections. 
Those details are worked out during the construction process 
between the designers and the various trades;178 
(f) The location of the future Hale Theatre was changed long 
after the loan closed.179 
There is no evidence that any design change that may have been 
made between the excavation work and the loan closing in June 2005 had 
any delaying impact on the closing of the construction loan. The Bank 
cites no evidence to support that contention. The undisputed fact is that 
the delay in closing the loan was entirely related to marketing the loan to 
potential participant banks. After the loan was subscribed to by sufficient 
participant banks the loan was closed. 
The argument regarding changes is wholly without merit as Claimants' 
discussion evidences and the witnesses Claimants have cited confirm. 
H. The Project Proceeded with Reasonable Promptness Despite 
Financing Delays. 
It is undisputed that the Bank and the Developer proceeded with 
reasonable promptness to get the financing of the Project funded. Krumm 
testified there was no guarantee how fast the financing would be completed. As 
Affidavit of Brett Harris, HIT 18-19 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
Affidavit of Brett Harris, H 20 [R.5337-5507, Exhibit "G"]. 
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Claimants have indicated, the ultimate timing of the completion of the financing 
was driven by the needs of the participant lenders to have a stronger guarantor 
and a stronger contractor - which the Developer obtained and the Bank 
approved. The primary activity in the early part of 2005 was the Bank obtaining 
sufficient participating banks to close the loan. After the stronger guarantor was 
provided (Jerry Moyes) and the supervisory contractor of Bud Bailey 
Construction was added to the team the Bank sold out the balance of the loan to 
its participant banks. 
The Bank cites no testimony or credible evidence that the Project did not 
proceed with reasonable promptness under the circumstances of this deal. This 
was a large and complicated deal. The Developer testified that it took 7-8 
months to do this complex financial deal.180 Mr. Krumm testified that it actually 
took longer: 
Q. When you were dealing with Larry Myler in this August-
September time frame, did you have discussions on how long you 
thought it would take to put together financing for the Midtown 
Village project? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me what was discussed in those conversations. 
A. Just that it all depended on how long it would take to syndicate it 
or participate the loan. It was open-ended. Whenever it got done, it 
got done. Best efforts on the sales part to get it participated. 
180
 Larry Myler Depo., 62:11-22 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
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Q. It's difficult to project how long it's actually going to take? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was a complicated deal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I think Larry Myler reported in one of the newspaper articles it 
was a complicated deal. It took seven or eight months to negotiate 
and get it done. Would you disagree with that statement? 
A. No. Other than - well, exception. I think it was longer than 
seven or eight months from when we first met in - I'll have to look at 
my affidavit.181 
Delays in obtaining financing, particularly for a large complex project, are 
not uncommon. The period of five months from the cessation of excavation in 
January 2005 to the closing of the loan in June 2005, however, do not support a 
finding of "material abandonment" as held by the court in Ketchem, Konkel.™2 
One of the projects in the case cited had a few month's delay after the 
excavation of the basement while another project had a fifteen month cessation 
in a nursing home construction project due to financing problems. No material 
abandonment was found in those cases and the Bank has not provided evidence 
to support its position that "material abandonment" occurred on the Midtown 
Project between January 2005 and June of 2005. 
181
 Jim Krumm Depo., 34:21 to 35:11; 135:11-20 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
182
 Ketch urn Konkel, Barret, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 
P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah App. 1989). 
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I. There was No Material Abandonment of the Project by Others 
Interested in the Project. 
The Bank incorrectly states that "the lien claimants themselves had notice, 
actual or constructive, that Midtown Village had been abandoned." There is 
absolutely no support for that statement and the Bank cites none. The Claimants 
that were involved prior to the loan closing were being told by the Developer that 
the financing was imminent and work would be resuming soon.183 Claimants 
were continuing to work with the Developer during the down time to resolve 
design and construction issues including Ken Harris Architects, Ellsworth 
Paulsen, Western States Mechanical, Tri-Phase Electric, Clayco, and others.184 
The Developer and Jim Krumm testified that they did not believe that 
Orem City ever abandoned their efforts related to providing some financing for 
the project.185 For the five month period where there was a cessation of physical 
work at the site before the loan closed, (although not in the design rooms, board 
rooms, or city hall rooms) Orem City worked on and ultimately concluded the 
issuance of bond financing for the underground parking.186 Moreover, the Bank 
and Krumm specifically knew that the Developer was continuing to sell condos 
while the Bank was working on financing package. 
183
 Eddie Ballard Depo., 32:5-19 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "1"]. 
184
 Id. 
185
 Larry MylerDepo., 116:13-24 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]; Jim Krumm Depo., 
114:4-7 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
186
 Jim Krumm Depo., 49:5 to 54:1; 119:8-11 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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During the time period in question, it is not disputed that the real estate 
agents kept in contact with those who had purchased units by, among other 
ways, sending out newsletters dated October 1, 2004 and April 15, 2005 
updating them on the status of the project.187 The Developer never told the 
existing buyers that the Project is abandoned.188 Western States Mechanical and 
Tri-Phase Electric were subcontractors who were hired in the fall of 2004 to help 
design the mechanical and electrical systems for the Project.189 Eddie Ballard, 
President of Western States Mechanical, testified that during the four months 
from when the pit was dug to when the trust deed was recorded, he met 
frequently at the site with Tri-Phase Electric, the architect, his subcontractor 
engineers, the owner and the general contractor to work on the design of the 
mechanical and electrical systems.190 The testimony of this work in the winter 
and spring of 2005, flies in the teeth of the Bank's contention that all work ceased 
on the Project. 
There is no evidence that any of the parties involved on the Project 
(developer, lead lender, subscribed participant lenders, designers, contractors, 
Orem City, real estate agents, buyers of units) abandoned it. In light of the 
overwhelming testimony (not legal conclusions) of the designers, the contractors, 
187
 Deposition Exhibits 96,154,158; Brett Harris Depo., 155 [R.5507 A, Exhibit 
"2"]; Larry Myler Depo. 31,42; 123:25 to 124:23 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
188
 Larry Myler Depo., 119:15 to 120:10 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "4"]. 
189
 Eddie Ballard Depo., 12:17 to 13:1;17:9-19;18:9-16 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "1"]. 
190
 Eddie Ballard Depo., 15:12-18 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "1"]. 
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the owner, the lender, the City personnel, and the realtors that efforts never 
ceased from the ground breaking until the money dried up after two-thirds of the 
project was constructed, the court should have no hesitation in finding that no 
genuine issue exists such as would preclude this Court from affirming the 
decision of the District Court.191 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED TITLE INSURANCE SOLELY 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT TO 
THE BANK. 
In announcing its oral decision to grant the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, the District Court specifically stated that it had "considered the 
existence of title insurance only for the purpose of showing notice; having nothing 
to do with negligence; having never looked at any policies or commitments."192 
Continuing further, the District Court stated that it had "considered title insurance 
only to show that the underwriter had gone out and looked at the [Pjroperty and 
talked to the [B]ank about it and had some concerns."193 
It could be noted that a prime example of a project which has been 
abandoned would be the Sugarhouse Hole project. That is an example of a 
project pit which was excavated, filled in, and years have gone by. If a developer 
now wanted to come back with a new and different project for construction on the 
site, this would be an entirely new project. Such is not the case in this Project. 
192
 See Transcript, at p. 64 [R.8538]; Order [R.7845-47] attached hereto as Third 
Addendum to the Brief. 
193
 See Id., at p. 64 [R.8538]; Order [R.7845-47] attached hereto as Third 
Addendum to the Brief. 
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Appellate courts reverse trial court decisions to admit or exclude evidence 
only if the trial court's ruling was "beyond the limits of reasonability."194 
Consequently trial courts have broad discretion with respect to evidentiary 
decisions and will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion. In the instant 
case, the District Court's consideration of the existence of title insurance solely 
for the purpose of showing notice of commencement of excavation is not beyond 
the limits of reasonability and certainly not an abuse of its discretion. 
Rule 411 expressly extends only to liability insurance to prove negligent or 
wrongful conduct. Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not 
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or 
otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of 
evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another 
purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or 
prejudice of a witness. 
In the instant matter, there is no liability insurance only title insurance. 
Title insurance creates duties of indemnity that arises out of acts or omissions 
that lead to the liability of the insured. In this case the title company has 
furnished the Bank with a promise to defend and indemnity against mechanic's 
lien claims that have priority. Any references by Claimants to title insurance were 
done solely to demonstrate admissions against interest about the knowledge of 
194
 See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, U 21, 190 P.3d 1269 (quoting Jensen v. 
IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, fl 51, 82 P.3d 1076). 
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commencement of construction and the fact that the construction of the Project 
was one continuous operation. 
Claimants did not mentioned title insurance for the purpose of showing that 
the Bank acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully but rather for the facts that 
Bank knew about and discussed problems with priority due to the 
commencement of construction; eventually requiring and obtaining title insurance 
to protect its interests in the Property. 
The pertinent facts include the following: 
(1) First American Title Company asked the title company 
handling the closing, Equity Title, to complete a Mechanics Lien Risk 
Analysis form in which the representative, who had seen the large 
hole in the ground, completed the Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis 
form by stating that "excavation had begun"195; and 
(2) BankFirst's Vice President, Jim Krumm, had visited the site 
and seen the large excavated hole where the south tower was to be 
built. Because of BankFirst's concern about the priority of liens for 
excavation it required the title company to make sure that those that 
performed the excavation work were paid off at the time of the 
closing.196 The Bank documents confirm that the title company 
agreed to provide title insurance. 
It would be reading Rule 411 too broadly to hold that when a person has 
observed something and recorded it in a document that just because that person 
works for a title company it renders it inadmissible. In this case a title insurance 
person witnessed the massive hole and wrote about that hole in a document. 
Deposition Exhibit 165; Adella Pearson Depo., 33 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "5"]. 
Deposition Exhibit 190; Jim Krumm Depo., 102 [R.5507 A, Exhibit "3"]. 
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That document is proof of their observation and does not fall within the ambit of 
Rule 411. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion and considered nothing that 
was irrelevant or inadmissible when it considered the existence of title insurance 
solely for the purpose of showing notice of the commencement of excavation. 
IX. APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
ON APPEAL. 
Appellees are entitled to their attorney fees and costs on appeal because their 
action arises from Utah Code § 38-1-1 et a/., which provides for an award of attorney 
fees and costs. Appellees explicitly request their attorney fees for this appeal. "A party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly 
and set forth the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Accordingly, 
Appellees are entitled to their attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Claimants respectfully request that this 
Court affirm the District Court's granting of partial summary judgment in favor of 
the Claimants. 
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>rd RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 a day of March, 2011. 
TT& BABCOCK PC 
ROBERT F BABCOCK 
KENT B. SCOTT 
CODY\oy/VILSON* 
Attorneys for Appellees 
*As directed by the Clerk of the 
Court, counsel has contacted 
counsel for each respective Appellee 
and all join in this brief. 
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I 
FILED 
Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Kent B. Scott (USB No. 2897) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK PC 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile: (801)531-7060 
Attorneys for Several Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER dba MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, ef al. 
Defendants. 
On April 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing for the parties to present oral arguments 
regarding Plaintiff Lien Claimant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 9, 2009. 
Robert F. Babcock and Cody W. Wilson were in attendance representing Plaintiffs 
Big-D Construction Corp., Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. - JV, 
Tim Risinger dba Marathon Triads Carpet Mill Outlet, BMC West Corporation, T.S. Electric, Inc., 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., Aspen View Construction, LLC, Valley View Building Services, 
Inc., Carey W. Olsen, Spectrum Engineers, Inc., Wasatch Ornamental Iron, Ken Harris 
Architect, R. P. Painting & Decorating, Inc., Ellsworth Paulsen Construction, Inc., and Federal 
Insurance Company; 
JUN 2 2 2010 
UTAH COUNTY f 
-fPROPOSEDfORDER 
Consolidated Case No. 080401531 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
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Paul Walstad was in attendance representing Plaintiff Clayco, Inc.; 
Mark L Poulsen was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Western States Mechanical, 
Inc., JPM, Inc. & Houghton Plaster, Inc.,- M.C. Green & Sons, Inc.; 
David R. Nielson was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Robert I. Merrill Co., Owell 
Precast, LLC, B&B Specialties, Inc.; 
Richard A, Rappaport was in attendance representing Plaintiff Reynolds Brothers, Inc.; 
Chris Hill was in attendance representing Plaintiff Quality Assurance Engineering; 
Mark D. Tolman was in attendance representing Plaintiff Sierra Pacific Industries; 
Mark E. Wilkey was in attendance representing Plaintiff SME Steel Fabricators, Inc.; 
Joseph D. McAllister was in attendance representing Plaintiff Firetrol Protection 
Systems, Inc.; 
Andrew Wadsworth and Bruce Shapiro were in attendance representing Midtown 
Joint Venture, LLC; 
Jared L. Anderson was in attendance representing Larry Myler; and 
Ronald G. Russell, Stephen E.W. Hale, Matthew J. Ball and Jenifer Tomchak were 
in attendance representing Defendants FDIC; Coralee Ellis; James A. Ellis; Edna H. Leavitt; The 
Leila Welling Home Family Trust; and Phyllis Wilson. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard oral arguments from the 
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as 
follows: 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-5 valid mechanics' liens on the Midtown property have priority over the trust 
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deeds of BankFirst, since owned by FDIC and now owned by United Western Bank, because 
visible construction work on the Main Building of the Midtown Village Project ("Project") 
commenced prior to the recording of the BankFirst trust deeds and the undisputed facts support 
the conclusion that the Project was not materially abandoned from the time the excavation work 
commenced in the fall of 2004 to the time the first loan closed in June 2005. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Excavation work was performed at the property located at 320 South State Street 
in Orem, Utah commonly referred to as Midtown Village (the "Project") beginning in September 
2004 through early 2005. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, 1J17-23 and P.32, 1J6-12; P.41, fl8 to 
P.43,1J18; P.114, H5-13; Brett Harris Deposition, P.110,1114-17; PP.115-120; Gary Reynolds 
Deposition, P.58 to P.60, fl17-20; Deposition Exhibits 96, 154 & 158. 
2. The dimension of the excavation work performed in late 2004 was approximately 
400' in length, 150' in width and 22' in depth. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31,1(17-23 and P.32, 
116-12; Deposition Exhibit 154. 
3. The excavated hole was for the mat footing and underground parking structure 
for the south wing of the Main Building. Allen Washburn Deposition, P. 118,1|25 to P. 120,1f14; 
Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, IP 7-23; P. 202, 1J14-18; Brett Harris Deposition, P.98, Tf9 to 
P. 100,1J11; Deposition Exhibit 20. 
4. A second hole for the north wing of the Main Building was also excavated in late 
2004 and early 2005. Larry Myler Deposition, P.41,fl8 to P.43, fi18; Gary Reynolds Deposition, 
P.60,1J17-20; P.65,1J16-24; P. 113,1J1-21; P. 138, f l 8 to P. 141,1J3 (as corrected); Deposition 
Exhibits 96, 158. 
5. The walls of the excavation identified above were stabilized with gunite and soil 
nails. Tod Wadsworth Deposition, P.50,1J6 to P.51,f l2; Deposition Exhibits 24, 129, 162, 190. 
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6. The excavation work was readily visible to anyone that visited the Project site. 
Jim Krumm Deposition, P.96, %2 to P.99, ffM; Larry Myler Deposition, P. 31, If 17-23 and P.32, 
U6-12; P.43, fl9-18; P. 61, fl 6-25; P.114, TJ5-13; Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50, fl21-25; p.58, 
1f25 to P.61, P 1 ; Deposition Exhibits 96, 165. 
7. The excavation for the mat footing and the underground parking became part of 
the overall work of improvement for the Main Building of the Project. Larry Myler Deposition, 
P.202, ^14-18. 
8. The construction deed of trust of BankFirst to secure a loan in the amount of $42 
million ("BankFirst Loan") was recorded on June 17, 2005 ("BankFirst Deed of Trust"). 
Deposition Exhibit 161. 
9. Before the loan closed both a representative of BankFirst and a representative of 
Equity Title Company, who was handling the loan closing, actually observed the excavation 
work identified above. Jim Krumm Deposition, P.96, 1J2 to P.99,1J11; Larry Myler Deposition,' 
P.60,1J16 to P.61,1J25; Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50,1J21 to P.52, fl4; P.58, fl25 to P.59, fl9; 
P.61, H5-20; Deposition Exhibit 165. 
10. Prior to the loan closing, on June 15, 2005, the representative of Equity Title 
Company completed a Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form indicating that her opinion based 
upon her inspection of the site was that excavation work on the improvement had commenced 
and that lien claimants existed. Adella Pearson Deposition, P.50, fl21 to P.52, fl4; P.61, 1J5-20; 
Deposition Exhibit 165. 
11. The funds used from the BankFirst Loan, were intended for, and were used for 
the building of the Main Building of the Project, including further and extensive work on the. 
premises by Plaintiffs. Larry Myler Deposition, P.139, 1J5-8. 
•faQQ -lOT HrWar 4 
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12. Mr. Larry Myler ("Mr. Myler") was the developer of the Project and was the 
principal contact person for each of the entities that he controlled in developing the Project 
including Western Oasis, Tower Development Sen/ices, Midtown LLC, and the Midtown Village 
Joint Venture. Larry Myler Deposition, P. 136, 1f2-6; P. 152, 1J15 to P. 155, flO-13; P. 116, 1J25 to 
P. 118,113. 
13. Midtown Village Joint Venture was the successor of the interests of Western 
Oasis, Tower Development Services, and Midtown LLC, in the development of the Project. 
Larry Myler Deposition, P. 116, H25 to P. 118, fl3; P. 136,1J2-6; P. 152, f l 5 to P. 155,1J10-13. 
14. BankFirst was the lender that worked with Mr. Myler from July of 2004 until 
BankFirst funded the $42 million loan in June of 2005. Jim Krumm Deposition, P.34, 1J21 to 
P.35, H11; P.44,1J24 to 1f45; P.46,1J3-21; P. 56', 1J24 to P.57, 1f5; P.70, f l 4 to P.71,1]6; P.77, 
1(11-22; P.78,1J6 to P.79, f lO; P.86, H5-15; Deposition Exhibits 155, 181, 184, 186, 187, 189, 
193. 
15. BankFirst (1) provided the Developer with a loan commitment letter for the 
Project in August 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 181; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.27); (2) required from 
the Developer a $15,000 good faith deposit for the Project loan in August of 2004 (Deposition 
Exhibit 183; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.39,1110-23); (3) helped arrange for a $562,000 loan to 
permit the Developer to commence excavating at the Project in September 2004 (Deposition 
Exhibits 153, 182; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.36,1J23 to P.37, TJ18; P.65,111-9; Larry Myler 
Deposition, P.26,1J22 to P.27,1f17); (4) developed and created its marketing package in 
September 2004 and began acquiring subscriptions from participant banks in October 2004 
(Deposition Exhibits 184, 185,186, 187; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.42, 45, 48, 51); (5) persisted 
in its efforts to finance the Project until it succeeded in having the loan closed in June of 2005 
(Deposition Exhibits187,188; Jim Krumm Deposition, P.51, 54); (6) acquired subscriptions from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
participant banks in October and November of 2004 (Deposition Exhibits 184, 185, 186, 187; 
Jim Krumrn Deposition, P.42, 45, 48, 51); (7) approved a stronger guarantor for the Developer 
to improve the marketing package in December of 2004 (Deposition Exhibit 188; Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.54); (8) maintained existing participant banks and acquired subscriptions from • 
additional participant banks in 2005 (one (1) in January; eight (8) in March; seven (7) in April; 
four (4) in May; and eight (8) in June)(Deposition Exhibits 185, 186, 187, 188; Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.45, 48, 51,54). 
16. At all material times the architect was Ken Harris Architects. Larry Myler 
Deposition, P.17, fl25 to P.18, fl4; Brett Harris Deposition, P.15,1J3-8; Deposition Exhibits 4, 18, 
19, 155, 181, 193. 
17. At all times material hereto, the Project has been a mixed use project with 
residential condos, professional offices, and retail spaces, in a Main Building situated in a "U" 
shape consisting of South, North and West wings with a central courtyard surrounding an Icon 
Tower. The Project was designed to have underground parking with approximately 98,000 
square feet of retail on the first floors; 106,000 square feet of office space on the second floors; 
and 243 residential condominiums on the third through seventh floors. More than 50% of the 
243 residential condos had been pre-sold and more than 50% of the retail space had been pre-
leased, before and while, BankFirst was marketing the financing package to participant banks. 
Larry Myler Deposition, P.36, fl4 to P.37,1J10; P.39, ff9 to P.40, fl11; Deposition Exhibits 115, 
181, 189, 193. 
18. At all times material hereto, there was a common plan on the Project - the 
Project remained a mixed use project with essentially the same make up in the uses. Larry 
Myler Deposition, P.20, fl2 to P.21, fl12; P.36,1|4 to P.37, ff10; P.39, fi9 to P.40, tf11; Deposition 
Exhibits 115, 181,189, 193. 
wooo A no r\~A~.» C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19. BankFirst and its bank representative to the Project were actively engaged in 
efforts to finance this Project, and five (5) months after the work on the excavation stopped, the 
loan was committed and closed. Deposition Exhibits 161, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188. 
20. From the loan closing on June 15, 2005, $650,000.00 from the loan proceeds 
was used to pay for the excavation work performed in September 2004 and early 2005 and 
$150,000 from the loan proceeds was used to pay for the gunite and soil nailing shoring work. 
"Admitted" by BankFirst in Request for Admission No. 17 in response to the Request for 
Admissions by Big-D, et a/., dated June 16, 2009 said admission being made after a recitation 
of general objections to the request; Deposition Exhibit 190. 
21. At the request of BankFirst for an additional guarantor, Myler made efforts to 
bring Mr. Jerry Moyes ("Mr. Moyes") in as an additional guarantor on the construction loan for 
the Project. Those efforts succeeded and Mr. Moyes became an additional guarantor on the 
loan to BankFirst in order for Midtown Village JV to obtain the loan from BankFirst. Jim Krumm 
Deposition, P.52,1J21 to P.53,1J24; Larry Myler Deposition, P.46, p to P.47, <p; Deposition 
Exhibit 188. 
22. There were ongoing efforts by BankFirst to market and close the loan during the 
fall of 2004 up through and until the Ioan_closed in June of 2005. Deposition Exhibits 161, 180, 
181,184,185,186,187,188. 
23. Mr. Myler and his various entities remained involved on the Project after Mr. 
Moyes got involved as a guarantor for the loan. See Development Agreements attached 
Exhibits "B" & "C" to Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment; Larry Myler Deposition, P. 116, fl25 to P. 118, P ; P. 136, TJ2 to P. 137, fl6; P. 152, fl15 
to P. 156,H20. 
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24. Ellsworth Paulsen Construction remained involved with the Project even though it 
worked with two other contractors during the course of the Project: Bud Bailey Construction 
was a co-general contractor before the loan closed, and Big-D was the co-general contractor 
after the loan closed. Larry Myler Deposition, P.89, [^25 to P.94, TJ17; Deposition Exhibits 18, 
19,21. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. ISSUE OF PROCEDURE. 
1. Priority is an element of the Plaintiffs' case, an element that Plaintiffs must establish; 
therefore Plaintiffs are not prohibited from proceeding in the manner they have chosen by 
addressing the priority issue on the Project prior to addressing the element of lien validity. 
2. The Court rejects the argument of Defendants that the Motion for Summary Judgment is 
premature. 
II. ISSUE OF PRIORITY. 
1. In accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-5 and E.W. Allen Associates, Inc. v. 
FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (1991), to determine the priority date of a mechanics' lien against 
another encumbrance, the Court must look to the commencement of work on the structure or 
improvements. 
2. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 was not 
mere site preparation work; rather it was clearly the commencement of a large construction 
project. 
3. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 constitutes 
constructive notice that work had commenced on the Main Building of the Project and that 
construction was underway. 
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4. The substantial excavation work done in September 2004 through early 2005 also 
constituted actual notice to both BankFirst and the title company that work had commenced on 
the Main Building of the Project and that construction was underway. 
5. The excavation for the underground parking and the mat footings in September 2004 
and early 2005 constituted the commencement of work on the Project pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-5, and all valid mechanics' liens relate back to the commencement of that 
work in September of 2004 and have priority over any encumbrance which attached subsequent 
to September, 2004. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-5, the valid mechanics' liens for work on the 
Project have priority over the subsequently recorded BankFirst Deeds of Trust. 
III. ISSUE OF MATERIAL ABANDONMENT, 
1. In accordance with Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage 
Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (1989), to determine whether material abandonment 
has occurred, the Court must determine if a single project was constructed under a common 
plan and prosecuted with reasonable promptness. 
2. At no time material hereto did BankFirst materially abandon the Project. 
3. At no time material hereto, did Larry Myler and his entities, including Western 
Oasis, Tower Development Services, Midtown LLC, and the Midtown Village Joint Venture, 
materially abandoned the Project. 
4. The Project was a single project constructed under a common plan. 
5. Any design changes that occurred were never such that the changes would 
signal that the Project that had been conceptualized was abandoned and a new different project 
was being commenced. 
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6. The same project that was commenced with the excavation for the mat footings 
and the underground parking was prosecuted, under the circumstances of this Project, with 
reasonable promptness without material abandonment. 
7. Any delay in this Project resulting from financial problems did not constitute an 
abandonment of the Project given the continued efforts by those involved including BankFirst to 
resolve those financial problems and the success of those efforts within approximately five (5) 
months resulted in the construction loan sold to participant banks, funded and closed. 
8. No cessation of work on the Project occurred that would be sufficient to put a 
reasonable observer on notice that the Project had been abandoned. 
9. The Project did not stop and another project was not initiated. 
10. The Project was not materially abandoned from the time the excavation work 
commenced in the fall of 2004 to the time that the loan closed in June 2005. 
DATED this £^t fay of J o yUU~ . 2010. 
FOURTH DISTRICT 
*-,;„;/^ y ^ 
JUflftfe SAMl$ElMiMcVEY • /*\ 
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Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Kent B. Scott (USB No. 2897) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK PC 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile: (801)531-7060 
Attorneys for Several Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
' IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER dba MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, et al. 
Defendants. 
On April 23, 2010, the Court held a hearing for the parties to present evidence and oral 
arguments regarding Defendants Motion to Strike filed on July 31, 2009. 
Robert F. Babcock and Cody W. Wilson were in attendance representing Plaintiffs 
Big-D Construction Corp., Big-D Construction Corp./Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. - JV, 
Tim Risinger dba Marathon Triads Carpet Mill Outlet, BMC West Corporation, T.S. Electric, Inc., 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc., Aspen View Construction, LLC, Valley View Building Services, 
Inc., Carey W. Olsen, Spectrum Engineers, Inc., Wasatch Ornamental Iron, Ken Harris 
Architect, R. P. Painting & Decorating, Inc., Ellsworth Paulsen Construction, Inc., and Federal 
Insurance Company; 
•CS-a-a 1 T 5 rirrlomn li«i-,Hr>n in Qtril-Q 1 
FILED 
JUN 2 2 2010 
UTAHCOUNTV 
_EERQ£QSEDJ-£RDER 
Consolidated Case No. 080401531 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
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Paul Walstad was in attendance representing Plaintiff Clayco, Inc.; 
Mark L Poulsen was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Western States Mechanical, 
Inc., JPM, Inc. & Houghton Plaster, Inc., M.C. Green & Sons, Inc.; 
David R. Nielson was in attendance representing Plaintiffs Robert I. Merrill Co., Owell 
Precast, LLC, B&B Specialties, Inc.; 
Richard A. Rappaport was in attendance representing Plaintiff Reynolds Brothers, Inc.; 
Chris Hill was in attendance representing Plaintiff Quality Assurance Engineering; 
Mark D. Tolman was in attendance representing Plaintiff Sierra Pacific Industries; 
Mark E. Wilkey was in attendance representing Plaintiff SME SteelFabricators, Inc.; 
Joseph D. McAllister was in attendance representing Plaintiff Firetrbl Protection 
Systems, Inc.; 
Andrew Wadsworth and Bruce Shapiro were in attendance representing Midtown 
Joint Venture, LLC; 
Jared L. Anderson was in attendance representing Larry Myler; and 
Ronald G. Russell, Stephen E.W. Hale, Matthew J. Ball and Jenifer Tomchak were 
in attendance representing Defendants Bank First; Coralee Ellis; James A. Ellis; Edna H. 
Leavitt; The Leila Welling Home Family Trust; and Phyllis Wilson. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard oral arguments from the 
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as 
follows: 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. The Court has disregarded the facts which the Defendants moved to strike with the 
exception of title insurance information, which the Court considered only for the purpose of 
1333.122 Order on Motion to Strike 2 
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si io^  vii ig i lotice, having if lothing to do i vitl i i legligei ice, policies or cat ru niti nei its The Cc i n It did 
not review any title insurance policies or comi riitments in rendering this decision. 
2. The Court finds that there are sufficient undisputed facts, i ipoi 1 which to decide the 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 9, 2009. 
3. • 1 1 lerefore, Defendants , July 3 1, 2009 Motioi l to Strike is hereby DENIED. 
1333,122 Order on Motion to Strike 3 
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4th SOUTH 
f mimiimmiimii njnjiiiiiiiiiimi^. 
\ NEW PROJECT FOR 
MIDTOWN VILLAGE 
LARRY MYLER OR EM, UTAH 
FIRST LEVEL FLOOR PLAN u ARCHITECT 
rtr< 
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1 BANK 
Great Basin Bank of Nevada 
Rosemount National Bank 
Security State Bank of Lewiston 
State Central Bank 
State Bank of Delano 
United Southwest Bank 
1 Northwestern Bank 
SunFirst Bank 
Mutual Bank 
Forreston State Bank 
Harwood State Bank 
First State Bank 
Peoples Bank of Deer Lodge 
First International Bank & Trust 
Nevada Bank and Trust Company 
Canton State Bank 
Banner Banks 
First National Bank & Trust Co. of Williston 
Canton State Bank 
Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Pierz 
1 Pioneer Bank 
First State Bank 
The Pueblo Bank and Trust Company 
East Dubuque Savings Bank 
Alaska Pacific Bank 
American Marine Bank 
The First National Bank 
Capital Savings Bank 
Ohio Heritage Bank 
BankWest, Inc. 
Savanna-Thomson State Bank 
Peoples Bank of Wisconsin 
Stratford State Bank 
Community Bank of Oelwein 
Bankfirst | 
SUBSCRIPTION DATE 
[October 7, 2004 
October 12, 2004 
October 12, 2004 
October 13, 2004 
October 15, 2004 
November 4, 2004 
November 10, 2004 
January 28, 2005 
March 21, 2005 
March 21, 2005 
March 22, 2005 
March 23, 2005 
March 24, 2005 
March 25, 2005 
March 25, 2005 
March 25, 2005 
April 1,2005 
April 5, 2005 
April 7, 2005 
April 8, 2005 
April 18, 2005 
April 18, 2005 
April 26, 2005 
May 11, 2005 
May 18, 2005 
May 18, 2005 
May 20, 2005 
June 1,2005 
June 3, 2005 
June 7, 2005 
June 8, 2005 
June 8, 2005 
June 13,2005 
June 14, 2005 
June 17, 2005 
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Late 2002 Developer begins to develop and plan for the /1 
Project / 
iu !4„ 2004 Developer makes good faith deposit to UIIIK 
for S15,000 to work on the loan package 
September 2002 The architect begins desien for 1v 
Ptoiect 
May 5, 2004 Ellsworth Paulsen enters contract with 
Developer to build Project 
July 28, 2004 Bank issues proposed financing terms for 
ii-e Project u» Develops 
August 18, 2004 Bank issues terms and conditions ib; an 
to Developer 
September 4, 2004 Excavation begins for the South 
Tower of the Main Building for the Project 
•<r 
Between September 4,2004 and January 2005 
Contractors perform $800,00+ in excavation, guniteing 
and soil nailing work for the 400'xl50'x22' pit , 
October 13, 2004 Ellsworth Paulsen recorded a 
Notice of Commencment for the Project with th, 
Utah County Recorder 
Wf-M^&M^W?* 
October 2004 the Developer has sold 50% ol n'.< 
Condon and leased 50% of the Retail space on i'-h 
Pioject 
January 6,2005 - June 15,2005 Developer, architect, & 
contractors working on electrial and mechanical design, 
architectural revisions, holding weekly Project 
construction meetings with Developer and contractors 
February 1, 2005 Wadsworth Brothers recorded a 
* ' hanic's lien against the property for the gunitc 
*'•'*
 nniN it provided to stablize the exrnvntH pit 
on the Project 
S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ H i ^ B IBKi l iZ i 
Spring 2005 Orem City working on the issuance of 
Special Improvement District bonds for the Project 
•: :i \ 2005 At the request of the Bank Ellsworth 
:se: idded partner to build Project-joinl ww'*--
.ornied with Bud Bailey Construction. 
Spring 2005 At the request of the Bank for a stronger 
n,.-i-..it i ippv Moycs brought into the i^io^t ^ "-
additional guarantoi 
April 2005 The Developer and the Project real estate 
broker issued a newsletter to current buyers of condo 
:=jj's confirming that the Project was very much a!i 
and the parties are there every day 
June 15, 2005 Equity Title prepares a Mechanics Lien 
Risk Analysis stating awork of improvement had 
commenced" ... "excavation has Ix^urr 
June 17, 2005 At the loan closing Developer pays 
backthc $562,000 loaned to start Project excavation 
June i7, 2005 At the loan closing Developer pays 
t "ontractors $1 million in construction and design work 
:,-.-.c between September 2004 and Janaiy 2005 work 
which was included on the schedule of values of the Bank 
August 23, 2005 Ellsworth Paulsen enters into joint 
venture with Big-D Construction for construction of the 
!>roicct in replacing of Bud Bailey Construction as inint 
venture partner 
\/ << 
!
^bc- 11, 2005 Ellsworth Paulsen/Big-D JV start 
pouring loundations in the South Tower pit and continue 
with the excavation for North Tower and central plant 
September 1, 2004 Bank facilitates $562,000 loan to 
'Vv eloper to commence excavation for the Piojci 
October 2004 Project soliciation package sent out by Bank 
to consortium of banks to subscribe for loan narticipation 
So; the Projet! 
Between October 2004 and June 2005 the Bank obtains 
subscriptions from participant banks 
October 2004 five banks subscribe to the Project loan 
November 2004 two banks subscribe to the Project loan 
January 2005 one bank subscribes to the Project loan 
March 2005 Bank sends out a revised Projeci 
to consortium of banks to subscribe foi loan 
participation for the Projcc; 
. . • ^ S ^ ^ ^ P ^ f c ^ ~ 
March 2005 eight banks subscribe to the Project loan 
Spring 2005 Bank representative makes Project site vis* 
with potential participant banks and observes the 
I massive excavation for South towei 
April 2005 seven banks subscribe to the Project loan 
May 2005 four banks subscribe to the Project loan 
TL June 2005 eight banks subscribe to the Project loan 
^ | June 17, 2005 Bank records Construction Deed of Trust in 
the amount of $42,000,000.00 
June 20, 2005 Bank provides final confirmations to all 
pari impaling banks which subscribes between Ociobei 
2004 and June 2005 
Between June 2005 and July 2007 Bank funds 
construction draws or t!.e Pretext 
\pr. M 2'MP records Construction Deed of TYUM in >' 
a n , r , , ,i .*re/p.00OOrtO 0') 
February 8, 2008 Work suspended on the Project dur t. 
lack of payment 
Between August 2007 and November 2007 Bank funds 
construction draws on the Project 
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